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Review of Privileged Documents in Trial and Deposition
Preparation of Witnesses in New York: When, if Ever,
Will the Privilege be Lost?
By Michael J. Hutter1
I. Introduction
Trial and deposition witnesses may forget or fail to mention
a relevant fact during the course of their examination at a trial
or deposition.2 Such forgetfulness is inevitable,3 and not an
unusual occurrence due to the lapse of time since the fact was
perceived, the complexity of the subject matter involved, or even
the nervousness of the witness during the examination itself.4
The best of witnesses, like the rest of us, can forget things that
occurred in the past.
When the witness suffers such a memory loss while
testifying, it is standard trial practice of the examining attorney,
as permitted under the common law of evidence in all state and
federal jurisdictions, to attempt to refresh the witness’s
recollection in order to have the witness testify to the forgotten
relevant fact. Refreshing recollection is “a last-ditch means to
secure information known to the witness but apparently lost to

1. Professor of Law, Albany Law School.
2. John M. Maguire & Charles W. Quick, Testimony: Memory and
Memoranda, 3 HOW. L.J. 1, 1 (1957) (“Impermanence and erratic flightiness of
human memory are great perils of litigation.”).
3. Brittany R. Cohen, “Whose Line is it Anyway?”: Reducing Witness
Coaching by Prosecutors, 18 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 985, 986 (2015) (“In
an ideal world, human memory would be infallible and . . . human beings
would have the ability to remember and relay events exactly how they
occurred. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Human memory is inherently
flawed . . . .”).
4. See generally 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET. AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 9, at 48-49 (7th ed. 2013); ROGER C. PARK ET. AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT’S
GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS § 1.08, at 22
(3d ed. 2010); Joseph J. Kalo, Refreshing Recollection: Problems with Laying a
Foundation, 10 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 233, 233 (1979); Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Refreshing Recollection: Witnesses with Memory Problems, 25 CRIM. JUST., 43,
43 (2010) (“It is not unusual in cases for witnesses, especially those who have
little experience testifying and are nervous, to forget things.”).
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conscious memory, hence lying beyond reach of ordinary direct.”5
A writing of some variety is usually employed in this process.6
When the effort is successful, the witness can testify from his or
her now revived memory. However, the witness’s testimony may
be perceived as less than credible because of the process
preceding it.
How then is the refreshing recollection scenario avoided or
at least minimized? The witness will, and must, be “prepped”
before testifying. Witness preparation refers to the process
where an attorney discusses with a witness the witness’s
prospective testimony at a forthcoming trial or deposition.7 It
has been noted that “American litigators regularly use witness
preparation, and virtually all would, upon reflection, consider it
a fundamental duty of representation and a basic element of
effective advocacy.”8 During the discussion the attorney will,
among other things, review with the witness the witness’s
personal knowledge and recollection of the facts relevant to the
action. The witness may review at the session, or even in
advance of the session at the request of the attorney or his or her
own initiative, various writings to refresh the witness’s
recollection when the witness is unable to relate the totality of
relevant facts within the witness’s personal knowledge or when
the relevant facts as related by the witness conflict or are
5. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 6:93, at 585-86 (4th ed. 2013).
6. 3 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL
& CRIMINAL § 32:3 (7th ed. 2016). When used in this article, the term “writing”
is to be read as including documents, records, memoranda, or other papers in
any form including electronic and photographs.
7. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 647-48 (1986).
8. John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 278-79
(1989). It must be noted that a failure to engage in any witness preparation
and even a failure to adequately prepare a witness, may be a violation of an
attorney’s ethical duty to provide competent representation to a client in
violation of ethical standards and rules. See United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d
310, 319 (4th Cir. 2000). Such a failure may also form the basis for a legal
malpractice claim. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 52 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2000) (general negligence standard may
require interviews with witnesses); Caso v. Miranda Sambursky Sloane
Sklarin Ver Veniotis LLP, 54 N.Y.S.3d 386 (App. Div. 2017) (citing the First
Department decision that Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his attorney’s
inadequate witness preparation prior to the witness’s deposition were based
upon a failure to refresh the witness’s recollection stated a claim for legal
malpractice).
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inconsistent with other available evidence.9 The goal is, of
course, to ensure that the witness’s testimony at the trial or
deposition is complete, accurate, and not unexpected. As one
court has noted: “This sort of preparation is essential to the
proper presentation of a case and to avoid surprise.”10
While such discussions present no ethical concerns for the
attorney, provided they are conducted properly,11 a concern of
another nature arises: Should a privileged writing be shown to
the witness? It may be that such a writing is the best or perhaps
the only tool for refreshing recollection purposes.12 However, a
risk is created by such a showing, namely, that the privileged
writing will now have to be disclosed to the opposing attorney.13
The opposing attorney will have become aware of such use by
the inevitable question to the witness during the questioning to
identify the writings which were reviewed by the witness during
the preparation sessions. A disclosure of this nature can be
devastating to the attorney who prepped the witness, adversely
impacting the attorney’s client, especially where the writing
contains comments and statements about the attorney’s theory
of the case, evaluation of strengths and weaknesses of the
parties’ case, or actions to be undertaken. While the witness’s
recollection may have been refreshed, the cost of doing so may
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116 cmt.
b (AM. LAW. INST. 2000); Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching,
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1995).
10. Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango, Co. v. Fire Ass’n of Phila., 20 F.R.D. 181,
183 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
11. Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Professional Conduct and the Preparation
of Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of “Coaching”, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389 (1987). When witness preparation becomes
problematic from an ethical perspective is a topic beyond the scope of this
article. For comprehensive reviews of this problem, see Wydick, supra note 9.
12. See Ettie Ward, The Litigator’s Dilemma: Waiver of Core Work
Product Used in Trial Preparation, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 515, 522-23 (1988)
(discussing reasons why attorney would provide witnesses with privileged
documents).
13. See generally Alfred F. Belcuore, Use It and Lose It – Privileged
Documents, Preparing Witnesses and Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 171 (1984); Daisy Hurst Floyd, A “Delicate and Difficult
Task”: Balancing the Competing Interests of Federal Rule of Evidence 612, the
Work Product Doctrine, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 101
(1996); Michael Keeley & Michael D. Feiler, You Can’t Ask That! Asserting
Work Product Protection for Deposition Preparation Materials, 40 BRIEF 34
(2011).
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result in the loss of an otherwise winnable case.
Under New York law, can the review of a privileged writing
by a witness in a preparation session prior to a trial or a
deposition lead to the writing’s privileged status being lost?
While it is well established in New York that the use of any
writing to refresh the recollection of a testifying witness at a
trial or deposition triggers an automatic disclosure of the writing
to opposing counsel, irrespective of its privileged nature,14 New
York law is unclear as to the consequences, if any, when the
witness reviews a privileged document prior to trial or
deposition. Specifically, in the absence of a governing statutory
provision and Court of Appeals precedent on point, it is unclear
as to whether: (1) the automatic disclosure rule applies at all in
the witness preparation context; (2) if the automatic disclosure
rule does apply, does a mere showing to or review of the writing
by the witness trigger disclosure, or will disclosure be mandated
only if the witness uses the writing to refresh his or her
recollection; and (3) can disclosure of a writing be ordered over a
claim of privilege. Notably, Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and federal court decisions interpreting the Rule,
provide guidance to how these questions are determined and
answered. However, there is not always unanimity among the
federal courts on these matters.
This article will examine New York’s refreshing recollection
doctrine in the context of trial and deposition preparation of
witnesses as to the consequences of the witness’s review of
privileged writings. Initially, Part II will discuss Rule 612 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The discussion will serve as the
backdrop for the analysis of the above-mentioned issues under
New York law. Part III will then examine the refreshing
recollection doctrine as developed and applied to testifying
witnesses at a trial or deposition by the New York courts. The
examination will point out the doctrine’s key rules. Part IV
discusses the treatment of these key rules by the New York
courts in the witness preparation situation, both pre-trial and
pre-deposition, showing the shortcomings of this judicial
treatment and advocating for change. Lastly, Part V makes
some suggestions to the attorney in light of current New York
14. See infra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
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law as to avoidance in the preparation of witnesses before they
testify at a trial or a deposition of the disclosure of otherwise
privileged writings.
II. Federal Rule of Evidence 612
A. Rule 612
Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 612 provides:
Rule 612. Writing Used to Refresh a Witness’s
Memory
(a) Scope. This rule gives an adverse party certain
options when a witness uses a writing to refresh
memory:
(1) while testifying; or
(2) before testifying, if the court decides that
justice requires the party to have those options.
(b) Adverse Party’s Options; Deleting Unrelated
Matter. Unless 18 U.S.C. § 3500 provides
otherwise in a criminal case, an adverse party is
entitled to have the writing produced at the
hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the
witness about it, and to introduce in evidence any
portion that relates to the witness’s testimony. If
the producing party claims that the writing
includes unrelated matter, the court must
examine the writing in camera, delete any
unrelated portion, and order that the rest be
delivered to the adverse party. Any portion
deleted over objection must be preserved for the
record.
(c) Failure to Produce or Deliver the Writing. If a
writing is not produced or is not delivered as
ordered, the court may issue any appropriate
order. But if the prosecution does not comply in a

5
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criminal case, the court must strike the witness’s
testimony or—if justice so requires—declare a
mistrial.15
Rule 612 covers a small part of the refreshing recollection
doctrine as applied in the federal courts. Under that doctrine,
when a witness is unable to relate facts within the witness’s
knowledge, the examining attorney is afforded the opportunity
to refresh the witness’s testimony through the use of a writing
or object.16 The basics of the doctrine, i.e., when the doctrine can
be invoked and the mechanics of its use, are governed by
common law rules adopted and developed by the federal courts.17
Rule 612 governs only the mechanics of the production,
inspection, and use of writings used to refresh a witness’s
recollection at trial while testifying or before testifying.
The inspection and use right given to an adverse party for
writings used to refresh the witness’s recollection while
testifying is unqualified. However, the right as given for
writings used before testifying is subject to the discretion of the
court, and production and inspection is only required if “justice
requires.”
Of note, the Rule, on its face, provides no privilege-based
exception to the inspection and use right, either when a writing
is used to refresh a witness’s recollection while testifying or
before testifying. Furthermore, while the Rule’s inspection right
clearly applies to writings used to refresh a witness’s recollection
before a trial, it is silent as to whether it is operative term
“testifying” applies in the context of preparing a witness for a
deposition as well.

15. FED. R. EVID. 612.
16. See BROUN ET. AL., supra note 4, at 48-49.
17. See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, §§ 6:94-6:97; 4
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§§ 612.01-09 (Mark S. Brodin & Joseph M. McLaughlin eds., 2d ed. 2016).
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B. Legislative History
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted on January 2,
1975 and deemed effective on July 1, 1975.18 The pre-enactment
history of the Federal Rules of Evidence is extensive.19
Specifically, Rule 612’s legislative history consists of three
Reporter’s drafts, prepared from 1965 through 1968,20 three
Advisory Committee drafts, prepared from March 1969 through
November 1972,21 and reports of congressional hearings
compiled from testimony at congressional hearings and
comments received as a result of the hearings.22 The history of
Rule 612 as gleaned from these documents is clear and
instructive as to the differing treatment of the inspection and
use right specifically granted by the Rule, depending upon
whether the use of the writing occurred while the witness was
testifying or before testifying. However, as to the issue of
whether the Rule could be employed to override a claim that the
writing could not be disclosed because it was privileged, the
legislative history is ambiguous as to the reason for the omission
of the treatment of a claimed privilege in the Rule.
As to the inspection and use right granted to the adverse
party, the Advisory Committee initially proposed in the
Preliminary Draft of March 1969 that an adverse party is
entitled to have such right not only as to any document used by
a witness to refresh the witness’s recollection while testifying,
but also as to any other document used prior to testifying for
refreshing recollection purposes. The right as granted was
18. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926, 1936 (1975).
19. An excellent resource for this history is the FRE Legislative History
Overview Resource Page, FED. EVIDENCE REV., http://federalevidence.com/
legislative-history-overview (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
20. See RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN & JOSHUA DEAHL, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: TEXT AND HISTORY xi-xii, 258-59 (2015).
21. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates,
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56 F.R.D. 183, 27677 (1973) (transmitted by the United States Supreme Court to Congress);
Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Revised Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidence, 51 F.R.D. 315, 399-400 (1971); Comm. on Rules of
Prac. & Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules
of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 306-07 (1969).
22. See FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra note 20, at xiii-xv.
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unqualified. In support of this proposal, the Committee stated:
The treatment of writings used to refresh
recollection while on the stand is in accord with
settled doctrine. The bulk of the case law has,
however, denied the existence of any right to
access by the opponent when the writing is used
prior to taking the stand, though the judge may
have discretion in the matter. An increasing group
of cases has repudiated the distinction., and this
position is believed to be correct. As Wigmore put
it, “the risk of imposition and the need of
safeguard is just as great” in both situations. To
the same effect is McCormick.23
The McCormick treatise cited in the Advisory Committee
Note stated the policy ground that supports this right of
inspection and use as follows:
With the memorandum in hand, the crossexaminer has a good opportunity to test the
credibility of the witness’s claim that her memory
has been revived, and to search out any
discrepancies between the writing and the
testimony. For instance, if there is no evident
nexus between the contents of the writing and the
fact purportedly remembered, the cross-examiner
can attack the plausibility of the witness’s
testimony that viewing the writing helped the
witness remember that fact. In the past, this
inspection right was usually limited to writings
used by the witness on the stand. However, the
policy reasons for inspection seem equally
applicable to writings used by the witness to
refresh her memory before she testifies.24

23. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note 21, at
307-08 (citations omitted).
24. BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 55-56 (citation omitted).
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Opposition to this proposal came from the Department of
Justice and Senator John McClelland.25 Among other concerns
expressed was that “cross-examination of witnesses may
deteriorate into lengthy fishing expeditions on the part of
counsel seeking to inquire what pieces of paper a witness has
seen during the courts of preparation for his testimony.”26
Responding to these concerns, the House Judiciary Committee
amended the proposed Rule to make the right of inspection and
use a discretionary one by adding after “before testifying” the
words “if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in
the interests of justice.”27 Its Report states:
As submitted to Congress, Rule 612 provided that
except as set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3500, if a witness
uses a writing to refresh his memory for the
purpose of testifying, “either before or while
testifying,” an adverse party is entitled to have
the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it,
to cross-examine the witness on it, and to
introduce in evidence those portions relating to
the witness’ testimony. The Committee amended
the Rule so as still to require the production of
writings used by a witness while testifying, but to
render the production of writings used by a
witness to refresh his memory before testifying
discretionary with the court in the interests of
justice, as is the case under existing federal law.
See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942). The Committee considered that
permitting an adverse party to require the
25. See Letter from Richard G. Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General,
United States, to Albert Branson Maris, Federal Judge, United States (1971)
(available at 117 CONG. REC. 33648, 33656-57) [hereinafter KLEINDIENST
LETTER]; Letter from John Little McClellan, Senator, United States, to Albert
Branson Maris, Federal Judge, United States (1971) (available at 117 CONG.
REC. 33642, 33645-46) [hereinafter MCCLELLAN LETTER].
26. KLEINDIENST LETTER, supra note 25, at 33657; MCCLELLAN LETTER,
supra note 25, at 33645.
27. H.R REP. NO. 93-650 (1973), as reprinted in FRIEDMAN & DEAHL, supra
note 20, at 262 [hereinafter House Report]. The compromise reached and the
discussions leading up to it are fully discussed in 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER
& LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 347, 597-99 (2d ed. 1994).
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production of writings used before testifying could
result in fishing expeditions among a multitude of
papers which a witness may have used in
preparing for trial.28
With respect to the privilege issue, attorneys, academic
commentators, and federal judges provided their comments
about the potential conflict between Rule 612 as proposed and
privilege law.29 The House Report concerning Rule 612 stated:
“The Committee intend[ed] that nothing in the Rule be
construed as barring the assertion of a privilege with respect to
writings used by a witness to refresh his memory.”30 A
discussion on the House floor between Representative Hungate
(House Manager of the Federal Rules of Evidence Bill) and
Representative White is also revealing:
Mr. WHITE. If there is, for instance,
hypothetically, a personal injury action, that is, if
a party to the personal injury action asks for the
work of an attorney. . .on matters on which the
party has re-trial [and must refresh his memory
before trial], then would the adverse attorney and
adverse party have the opportunity to inspect that
work?
Mr. HUNGATE. If the gentleman will yield, I
understand—and if I am in error, some other
members of the committee can correct me—the
attorney’s work product would not be subject to
that inspection.
If it was used to refresh the memory of a witness
would it then not be subject to inspection?

28. House Report, supra note 27, at 13.
29. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, at 583-84; Martha J.
Aaron, Resolving the Conflict Between Federal Rule of Evidence 612 and the
Work-Product Doctrine: A Proposed Solution, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1039, 1045-46
(1990).
30. House Report, supra note 27, at 13.
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If it was used while testifying. If it were used
before testifying there are different limitations on
it.
Mr. WHITE. You see, the way it reads, it says
“before testifying.” In other words, if you use it
before testifying then it is a memory refreshener
[sic].
Mr. HUNGATE. It can become a discretionary
matter with the court in that case. The rule was
originally broader than this, as I recall it. We have
tried to narrow the past rule, the rule that one
point could have meant bringing in everything
you used to refresh your memory, and the
committee has sought to restrict that. You could
use the classic examples, for instance, of patent
cases or antitrust cases where you might have
several large railroad boxcars full of documents,
and to force them to be brought in could prove to
be harassment.
Mr. WHITE. Does not the chairman’s own
interpretation mean that at the court’s discretion
the court could insist that the adverse party bring
to the opponent the material on which the witness
refreshed his memory, is that correct?
Mr. HUNGATE. The gentleman is raising a good
point, because I think the gentleman is putting
two legal concepts at each other’s throats, one
would be perhaps the original work product of the
attorney, and I am not qualified to say that this is
paramount, but it was not meant to repeal the
attorney-client relationship, and, let me add, this
does not write that out of its present existence. It
does not do away with it. What we concentrated
upon was in these extremely long cases where
there would be lots and lots of documents, and
where it would be a harassment to have them all

11
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brought in.
And it says, again, as the gentleman I am sure
realizes:
If the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary in the interest of justice. . . .
Mr. WHITE. Is not this then a change in the rule,
a change from the general evidentiary rules in the
Federal courts?
Mr. HUNGATE. That is not the case, as I
understand it.
Mr. WHITE. Presently in civil actions or personal
injury actions, using the same hypothetical
question, can an opponent obtain the material on
which a witness refreshed his memory before he
comes to testify, before the case?
Mr. HUNGATE. He could not do so.
Mr. WHITE. So this is a radical change.
The point I am trying to make is that this is an
inconsistency, that a man would have to produce
the writings that he had used prior to coming to
testify, whatever he refreshed his memory on, but
he probably could not use the same writing in that
regard, if these were self-serving to him. The
lawyer’s own work product would then be subject
to inspection if it was used to refresh the memory
of a witness, and thus you have intruded into a
very established rule of law.
Mr. HUNGATE. However, we come back to the
fact that this does not wipe out the other sections
of the law, or the law as it exists regarding the

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/6
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privilege of attorney-client relationships, or their
work products.31
Despite this attention to the issue, it was never resolved.32
The legislative history of the Rule shows only that the Rule
apparently was not intended to eliminate privilege protection for
writings protected by a privilege, but fails to show how privilege
rights are to be accommodated with the inspection and use right,
if at all.
Lastly, there is no indication in Rule 612’s legislative history
that discussion was had as to whether the inspection and use
right was applicable where a witness’s recollection was being
refreshed in preparation for a deposition. A commentator has
noted that the Rule’s requirement of document disclosure “at a
hearing” strongly suggests that the Advisory Committee and
Congress had only trials in mind.33 On the other hand, another
commentator has contended that the words “for the purpose of
testifying” and the explanation for those words in the Advisory
Committee’s Notes shows Congress intended to have the right
apply to a pre-deposition review of documents by a witness.34
These differing interpretations raise the issue as to legislative
intent, but do not resolve it.
C. Judicial Construction of Rule 612
1. Applicability to Depositions
The courts addressed early on the issue left open by
Congress of whether Rule 612 applied to deposition testimony
where the deponent-witness’s recollection was refreshed by the
use of a writing while testifying or before testifying. After noting
31. 120 CONG. REC. 1301, 2381-82 (1974).
32. Alfreda Robinson, Duet or Duel: Federal Rule of Evidence 612 and the
Work Product Doctrine Codified in Civil Procedure Rule 26(B)(3), 69 U. CIN. L.
REV. 197, 206-07 (2000) (noting the extensive consideration by members of
Congress to Rule 612).
33. See John S. Applegate, Preparing for Rule 612, 19 LITIG. 17, 17-18
(1993) (noting that a deposition is not called a “hearing”).
34. Robinson, supra note 32, at 205 (noting the phrase is a “safeguard
against using the rule as a pretext for wholesale exploration of an opposing
party’s files”).
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that with respect to this issue the Rule itself is “silent” and its
legislative history “somewhat ambiguous,”35 the courts have
consistently held the Rule is applicable to deposition testimony
through Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.36 The
portion of Rule 30(c)(1) the courts relied upon provides that
“[t]he examination and cross-examination of a deponent
proceed[s] as they would at trial under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, except Rules 103 and 615.”37 One court has also noted
that since deposition transcripts are frequently used at trial in
place of live testimony, it is appropriate to conclude that Rule
612 does apply to deposition testimony.38
There is contrary authority. In Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v.
Foster Wheeler Corp.,39 the court held Rule 612 did not apply to
deposition testimony.40 The court’s rationale for so holding was
as follows:
[T]he notes of the Advisory Committee talk of use
of writings to refresh recollection while a witness
is “on the stand” or prior to “taking the stand.”
While it may be argued that a deposition witness
is on the “stand” during a civil deposition
examination, it is unlikely that such a meaning is
reasonable when you analyze the entire Rule, the
Committee Note and the cases cited by the
Committee in conjunction with the Note. Thus, it
appears that the first sentence of Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(c) deals only with the procedures for
35. See, e.g., Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458,
467 (D. Md. 1948).
36. See, e.g., Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 1985); Magee v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); James Julian,
Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982); Marshall v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 1980); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.
Underwriters Labs., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1).
38. Nutramax Labs., 183 F.R.D. at 467 n.7. FED. R. CIV. P. 32 permits the
use of deposition transcripts at a trial and FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) permits, as
an exception to the hearsay rule, the admission of transcripts of prior
testimony from a trial.
39. Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 109 F.R.D. 615 (D.
Neb. 1986).
40. Id. at 616.
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examination and cross-examination and not with
the substance of the examination. Otherwise, the
plain language of Rule 612 would permit a broad
ranging inquiry into highly protected opinion
work product, something clearly not envisioned by
the drafters of the Rule. The word “testifying” as
used in the Rule contemplates the presentation of
evidence at a hearing before a judge or
magistrate.41
While the court’s rationale is supportable,42 no other court
has adopted its holding and it stands “virtually alone in its
position that Evidence Rule 162(2) [sic] does not apply in a
deposition setting.”43
2. Meaning of “While Testifying”
The distinction between “while testifying” and “before
testifying” as set forth in Rule 612(a) is readily apparent and
seemingly needs no clarification. However, an issue concerning
this distinction arose in Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.44 In this
case, Plaintiff contacted an attorney in search of legal advice for
an employment discrimination action she wanted to pursue. The
attorney directed her to complete a form entitled “Possible Case
Intake” and provide a chronological summary of events in the
form. She did as directed and returned the completed form to
the attorney.
An employment discrimination action was
subsequently commenced against Defendant, her employer. At
Plaintiff’s deposition, defense counsel asked her questions
regarding any statements she had prepared about her
employment. She testified that she had prepared a statement
on her own but could not remember whether it was made before
or after she met with the attorney.45 At that point a recess was
taken. When the deposition continued, Plaintiff testified: “After
41. Id. at 616-17 (citation omitted).
42. See Applegate, supra note 33, at 18.
43. Napolitano v. Omaha Airport Auth., No. 8:08CV299, 2009 WL
1393392, at *3 (D. Neb. May 11, 2009).
44. See Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 403 (D. Kan. 1998).
45. Id. at 406.
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we took a break, my lawyer showed me the documents, and I
remembered that I wrote them in November 1996 at my
attorney’s request.”46 This review, she further testified, “helped
me to place the date when I wrote he [sic] documents . . . .”47
Defendant then moved to compel production of those
referenced documents. It argued that the documents were not
privileged, and, even if they were, that status did not preclude
production because they had the right to inspect and use the
documents since she used the documents to refresh her memory
while testifying at her deposition.48 Plaintiff argued that the
documents were protected by privilege and that Defendant was
not automatically entitled to inspect them just because Plaintiff
used them before testifying at her deposition, requiring the
documents to be produced only if the court in its discretion so
ordered, an order that was not warranted at that time.49
The court denied the motion to compel. It initially concluded
the form was protected by the attorney-client privilege.50 It then
held that the automatic right of inspection and use of documents
to refresh a witness’s recollection, which could override the
privilege, did not apply as Plaintiff reviewed the documents
“before testifying” and not while testifying. It stated:
Within the meaning of Fed.R.Evid. 612(1), “while
testifying” requires more than the fact that the
review occurred after commencement but before
completion of a deposition. Plaintiff had left the
witness stand. Transcription had ceased until her
testimony resumed. She proffered no testimony
during the break. In short, she was not then
testifying. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule
612 support the finding that plaintiff reviewed the
document “before testifying.” They equate “while
testifying” to “while on the stand” and “before
testifying” to “prior to taking the stand.” See
Fed.R.Evid. 612 advisory committee notes. Her
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 407.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 405.
Hiskett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 403, 407 (D. Kan. 1998).
Id. at 405.
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review of the document impacted only testimony
after her deposition recommenced. The review
occurred before she took the stand to begin her
after-break testimony.51
The Court’s holding has been criticized as form over
substance.52 The argument is that because the refreshing
occurred on matters that were being examined on at the time of
the review, the review occurred “while testifying.”53
D. Meaning of “Uses a Writing to Refresh Memory”
Rule 612 grants an inspection and use right with respect to
a document only when a witness “uses a writing to refresh
memory.”54 While this foundation element for invoking the right
is obviously ascertainable when the refreshing recollection
process is pursued while a witness is testifying and the
recollection is refreshed, use of a writing before a trial or a
deposition to refresh a witness’s recollection is not as apparent.55
When use is present in the latter situation has been the subject
of several federal court decisions.
The courts have uniformly held that to trigger the
inspection and use right, it must be established that the witness
actually relied on the writing to refresh his or her recollection
for the purpose of testifying.56 Thus, merely looking at a
document prior to testifying will not trigger inspection and use.57

51. Id. at 407-08.
52. See 2 PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED
STATES § 9:40, 260 (2013-14 ed. 2013).
53. Id.
54. FED. R. EVID. 612(a).
55. 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 612.05, at 612-49 n.1 (1987) (“There is no mechanism for
ascertaining the existence of the writings used other than reliance on the
integrity of witness and counsel.”).
56. 1 DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 358, 360 (3d
ed. 2015) (“most courts require a showing that the privileged material actually
impacted the witness’s testimony.”).
57. See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 674, 679
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps (Hawaii), Ltd., 85
F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
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This requirement of use is designed to ensure that the
writing is relevant to an attempt to test the credibility of the
witness.58 It also safeguards against use of the right of
inspection and use granted by the Rule “as a pretext for
wholesale exploitation of an opposing party’s files.”59
Thomas v. Euro RSCG Life60 is illustrative of the analysis
to be employed in determining use. In this case, Plaintiff
acknowledged that she reviewed shortly before her deposition
chronological notes provided in confidence by her to her attorney
for the purpose of seeking legal advice. She also admitted that
it would have been “very difficult” for her to recall all of the
Under these
events without referring to those notes.61
circumstances the Court concluded that Plaintiff relied on her
notes in connection with her deposition testimony.62 In addition,
the Court noted that events summarized in the notes “were a
central part of the deposition” and were “likely to play a
substantial role in Plaintiff’s case.”63 As a result, the notes
would have a significant impact on the Plaintiff’s testimony.
Thus, the Court concluded that it would exercise its discretion
to order disclosure of the notes.64
As Thomas indicates, the proof necessary to establish the
requisite use will ordinarily be obtained by an examination of
the witness at the deposition or at the trial. The examining
attorney will need to examine the witness as to documents relied
upon in giving his or her testimony and whether those
documents influenced the testimony.65 To be sure, the witness
58. Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 1985) (“the document is of
little utility for impeachment and cross-examination without a showing that
the document actually influenced the witness’ testimony.”).
59. Id. at 317.
60. Thomas v. Euro RSCG Life, 264 F.R.D. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
61. Id. at 122.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. It should be noted that where the witness has been provided certain
writings, and those writings as selected or culled from numerous other
documents, the provided documents may be protected as core attorney workproduct. See James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del.
1982) (“In selecting and ordering a few documents out of thousands counsel
could not help but reveal important aspects of his understanding of the case.
Indeed, in a case such as this, involving extensive document discovery, the
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may testify that he or she only “looked at” writings prior to
testifying, seeking to preclude production of those documents.
In such a situation, examination of the witness as to specific
writings reviewed and the amount of time reviewing the
writings may inferentially establish that the writings were
relied upon to refresh the witness’s recollection.66 Where the
time involved was considerable and the witness can recall
specific writings received, the use of these writings for
refreshing recollection purposes can be established,
notwithstanding the witness’s contrary statement.67
E. Automatic Disclosure and Discretionary Disclosure
As previously discussed,68 Rule 612 grants a right of
inspection and use to an adversary party of the writing used to
refresh a witness’s recollection. With respect to the standard to
be applied for the implementation of this right, the Rule
distinguishes between two situations. Where the witness’s
recollection is refreshed by the writing, the Rule grants an
absolute or unqualified right to inspect and use whereas if the
witness’s recollection is refreshed by a writing before testifying
at either a trial or deposition, the adversary party has access to
the writing only if the court decides that “justice requires” it.
While the “absolute” right part of the Rule has presented no
problems for the courts to resolve,69 its discretionary part has

process of selection and distillation is often more critical than pure legal
research. There can be no doubt that at least in the first instance the binders
were entitled to protection as work product.”). But see Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.
of Pittsburg, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 01-2009-KHV, 2002 WL 113879, at *1 (D.
Kan. Jan. 22, 2002) (court required identification of documents shown to
witness prior to his deposition, rejecting argument that selection of such
documents constituted core attorney work-product).
66. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 615
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (for Rule 612 to apply it must be shown “at least to a strongly
arguable degree” that a writing impacted the testimony of the witness).
67. See Bank Hapoalim, B.M. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 92 Civ.
3561 (KMW), 1994 WL 119575, at, *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1994); see also RICE
ET AL., supra note 52, at 743-44.
68. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 637
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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generated substantial case law as to its application.70
To determine what “justice requires” in the case before
them, the courts, as Rule 612’s legislative history instructs,
balance the Rule’s goal of accurate fact finding71 against the
prevention of time-consuming fishing expeditions at trial and
depositions for writings that may have influenced the witness’s
recollection.72 The factors considered include:
[T]he importance of the witness’ testimony, the
extent to which the witness apparently relied
upon writings used to refresh memory, the extent
to which the writings might reveal a credibility
problem, whether credibility could be tested
effectively in some less burdensome way, and
whether there is evidence of a calculated plan to
use writings to improperly influence the
testimony of a witness and resist production in
order to conceal this influence [and] . . . the extent
of the materials sought[.] [This] permit[s] the
adverse party to exercise rights under Rule 612,
the courts have considered the extent of the
materials sought, whether such materials are
privileged or attorney work product, whether

70. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, at § 612.04(4)(b) (collecting
cases); 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 6188 (2d ed. 2012) (collecting cases). It should be noted that
“justice requires” replaced “in the interest of justice,” the words in Rule 612
when originally enacted, in the course of the general “restyling” of the Federal
Rules of Evidence that became effective December 1, 2011. See FEDERAL
EVIDENCE REVIEW, supra note 19 (2011 Amendment to Restyle the Federal
Rules of Evidence). No change of meaning was intended.
71. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, at § 612.04(4)(b); WRIGHT &
GOLD, supra note 70, at § 6182.
72. See Note, Interactions Between Memory Refreshment Doctrine and
Work Product Protection Under the Federal Rules, 88 YALE L.J. 390, 393 n.24
(1978) (noting that the “interest of justice” standard codifies the rule of
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), that inspection and use right
under the common law is subject to the court’s discretion to guard against
fishing expeditions); see also In re: Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
314 F.R.D. 397, 402 (E.D. La. 2016) (“While the purpose of Rule 612 is to aid
the pursuit of truth by prompting the unavoidably imperfect memories of
witnesses, courts struggle with litigants who attempt to use Rule 612 for
purposes of discovery.”).
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some policy extrinsic to the evidence rules
suggests the materials should not be disclosed, the
probity of the adverse party’s conduct in
connection with the requested production, and
whether production of writings could unduly
delay proceedings because the materials are
difficult to assess.73
Unfortunately, the courts rarely set forth the precise
manner in which it makes its decision as to whether “justice
requires” the production of the writing.74 An exception is the
thoughtful decision of the Court in Barcomb v. Sabo, an excellent
example of the application of the standard.75 Plaintiff, a state
college police officer, commenced a federal civil rights action
against college officials, alleging they “falsely arrested and
maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his constitutional
rights,” causing him to be suspended from his employment.76 At
the deposition of a college employee (“Welch”):
[S]he testified that a few months prior to the
deposition, she and others printed all the
electronic mail communications relevant to the
case, sorted them into chronological order,
reviewed them together, and [forwarded them to
the attorney representing the defendant officials].
Welch [further] testified that it was “very
possible” that the emails formed at least some of
her current recollection of the events surrounding
[plaintiff’s] suspension, and that after reviewing
and printing the electronic mails, she “put [a] time
73. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 70, at § 6185. Privilege claims will be
discussed separately infra notes 82-115 and accompanying text.
74. EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: A
STUDY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE BY THE SECTION OF LITIGATION,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 186 (David A. Schleuter & Stephen A. Saltzburg
eds., 3d ed. 1998) (citing Smith & Wesson, Div. of Bangor Punta Corp. v. United
States, 782 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1986) and Cosden Oil & Chem. Co. v. Karl O.
Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984)).
75. Barcomb v. Sabo, No. 07-CV-877 (GLS/DRH), 2009 WL 5214878
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009).
76. Id. at *1.
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line together” which was “possib[ly]” shaped by
the information she gathered while copying and
correlating
all
of
the
electronic
mail
communications. Based on [her] review and her
recollection that defendants . . . were all given the
same packet of electronic mails to review prior to
their depositions, [plaintiff] demand[ed their]
production. . . pursuant to Rule 612.77
The Court ordered the documents to be disclosed to Plaintiff.
As for its rationale in so ordering, the Court initially noted that
Welch had examined all these electronic mails while she was
organizing them and possibly used them as a basis for both her
current testimony and the time lines that were used during the
course of hers and others’ depositions. The Court concluded this
testimony “demonstrat[ed] an [sic] a sufficient impact on witness
testimony for both Welch and [Defendant] Sabo.”78 Additionally,
the Court noted that it was unknown to what degree the
electronic mail circulations impacted the testimony of the other
employees who were present photocopying, correlating, and
reviewing the documents prior to the depositions.79 As to this
fact, the court commented that “[m]ass sharing of electronic mail
communications raises a significant issue for fair and effective
cross-examination concerning matters reviewed by a witness in
preparation for his or her testimony.”80 Lastly, the Court
observed that “the time lines included information about
[Plaintiff’s present] suspension and criminal charges”—
”information [which was] directly relevant to [Plaintiff’s] theory
of his case.”81 For these reasons, the Court held “disclosure
under Rule 612, does not constitute a fishing expedition but a
necessary action to ensure fairness.”82

77. Id. at *8 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at *9.
79. Barcomb v. Sabo, No. 07-CV-877 (GLS/DRH), 2009 WL 5214878, *9
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Barcomb v. Sabo, No. 07-CV-877 (GLS/DRH), 2009 WL 5214878, at
*9 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009).
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F. Privilege and Work-Product Claims
A writing subject to automatic or discretionary production
may be protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege83 or as work product.84 A “tension” or “conflict” has
been recognized between the production directive of Rule 612
and the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege and
the work-product doctrine.85 The issue presented is whether
Rule 612 production right overrides the privilege protections.
When a writing is used to refresh a witness’s recollection
while testifying, and thus subject to automatic production, the
83. The attorney-client privilege, as governed by Federal Rule of
Evidence 501, protects against disclosure of confidential communications
between attorneys and their clients. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998). It is “intended to encourage ‘full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of
justice.’” Id. at 403 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981)). While the reported decisions involve the attorney-client privilege,
other privileges can also be invoked, and will be treated similar to attorneyclient privilege claims. See Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627,
637 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (physician-patient privilege); Audiotext Commc’ns
Network, Inc. v. US Telecom, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1996) (“any
privilege”).
84. The work-product doctrine is defined as the “protection that
applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent)
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.” FED. R. EVID. 502(g)(2). Workproduction protection encompasses both advisory work-product, such as
diagrams, photographs and reports prepared by or for any attorney and opinion
work-product, including the opinions, strategies, or mental impressions of an
attorney, so called core work-product. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2000). However, under FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii), ordinary work-product is generally immune from
discovery unless the party seeking disclosure “has substantial need for the
materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their
substantial equivalent by other means.” Under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B)
opinion work-product is immune from disclosure. See Appleton Papers, Inc. v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 702 F.3d 1018, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 2012). FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3)(A)-(B) is, in essence, a codification of the holdings of Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the seminal work-product decision, which holdings
were justified by the Supreme Court upon several policies, including the
prevention of ill-prepared opposing counsel from piggy-backing on the effort
put forth by a more diligent attorney on the other side. Id. at 510-11.
85. See In re: Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 314 F.R.D. 397,
400-01 (E.D. La. 2016) (“conflict”); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”)
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1358(SAS), 2012 WL 2044432, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
June 6, 2012) (“tension”).
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courts have uniformly held that the protections against
disclosure afforded by the attorney-client privilege86 and the
work product doctrine are lost.87 As to the latter, the loss of
protection may extend to core attorney opinion work product.88
As stated in a leading treatise: “There is little doubt that using
documents to refresh memory on the witness stand waives or
defeats a claim of attorney-client privilege by the calling party
or a claim of work product protection by the lawyer.”89 The basis
for this conclusion, as expressed by the courts, is that the right
of inspection and use recognized by Rule 612 with respect to a
writing used while the witness is testifying is absolute.90
However, when a document protected by the attorney-client
privilege or work-product doctrine is used to refresh a witness’s
recollection before testifying at a trial or a deposition, and thus
subject to a discretionary production, the courts are in wide
disagreement on whether the protection is lost by such use.
Various approaches to resolution of this issue have been taken.91
Several courts take the position that neither the attorneyclient privilege nor work-product doctrine apply as a bar to
production of an otherwise protected writing.92 The apparent
86. See, e.g., Beattie v. CenturyTel., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Mich.
2009); Jolly v. Coughlin, No. 92 Civ. 9026 (JGK), 1995 WL 495641, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1995); United States v. Finkielstain, 718 F. Supp. 1187,
1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); S & A Painting Co. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407, 409
(W.D. Pa. 1984).
87. See, e.g., Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1982); Sperling
v. City of Kennesaw Police Dep’t, 202 F.R.D. 325, 328 (N.D. Ga. 2001); S & A
Painting Co., 103 F.R.D. at 409.
88. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616-17
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
89. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, at 601.
90. Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 637 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (“[B]eing phrased in mandatory language, Rule 612(1) prevails when
pitted against a claim of privilege.”).
91. See generally In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 241,
243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing three different approaches taken by the
courts to resolve the issue); Barrer v. Women’s Nat’l. Bank, 96 F.R.D. 202, 204
(D.D.C. 1982) (noting the conflicting case law on interaction of Rule 612 and
claims of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection).
92. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(attorney-client privilege and work-product); United States v. 22.80 Acres of
Land, 107 F.R.D. 20, 25 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (attorney-client privilege and workproduct); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982)
(work-product); Marshall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C.
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basis of these decisions is that it is always necessary in the
interest of justice to have disclosure of documents used before
testifying.93 This approach has been the subject of criticism in
the courts, with courts opining that such approach is
“inconsistent with the advisory committee note indicting that
Rule 612 does not bar the assertion of privilege [protection,]”94
and that it eliminates judicial discretion when Congress
intended discretion to be exercised in all before testifying
situations.95
At the other extreme, a few courts have concluded that
production of the writing protected by the attorney-client
privilege or work-product doctrine can only be ordered if the
protection has been waived by actions other than its use for
refreshment purposes.96 This approach was explained by one
court as follows:
[T]he relevant inquiry is not simply whether the
documents were used to refresh the witness’s
recollection, but rather whether the documents
were used in a manner which waived the attorneyclient privilege. This could happen, for example, if
privileged communications were disclosed to an
individual outside the privileged relationship. On
the other hand, the privilege would not be lost if
an individual were to review his own already
privileged documents.97

1980); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 81 F.R.D.
8, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Berkey Photo, Inc., 74 F.R.D. at 616 (suggesting Rule 612
left privileges generally untouched).
93. Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 13, 16 (D. Mass. 1988).
94. In re Rivastigmine, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
95. See Derderian, 121 F.R.D. at 16.
96. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 5, at 601.
97. Suss v. MSX Int’l. Eng’g Servs., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (citations omitted) (attorney-client privilege); see also In re Managed
Care Litig., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (attorney-client
privilege and work-product); U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Cont’l
Airlines, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 738, 744 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (deliberative privilege).
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Criticism of this approach has been expressed by a court as
follows:
However, there may well be instances where it is
“necessary in the interest of justice” to require the
production of a document as to which the privilege
has not been waived in order to permit adequate
cross-examination. For example, someone within
the privileged relationship may be shown a
document that he has never seen before in order
to refresh his recollection, and it would be
prejudicial to the party taking the deposition to be
denied access to the document.98
A third approach, termed the “functional analysis” test, has
been adopted by a substantial number of federal courts.99 This
approach has been described as “better reasoned” then the other
two above stated approaches.100 Under this approach, the
protections afforded to witnesses protected by the attorneyclient privilege and work-product doctrine are to be taken into
account in the balancing approach, which is made under the
“justice requires”/”interests of justice” standard,101 and are
significant factors to be considered.102 In this regard, the
interests of the party resisting production in protecting its
confidential information in the writing balance against the need
of the party seeking production to see the writing so as to test
the witness’s credibility.103 Under this approach the “justice
requires”/”interests of justice” standard may sometimes,
depending upon the given circumstances, require the production
of a writing as to which its protections under the attorney-client

98. In re Rivastigmine, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Calandra v. Sodexho, Inc., No. 3:06CV49 (WWE), 2007 WL
1245317, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 27, 2007); In re Rivastigmine, 486 F. Supp. 2d at
243; Bank Hapoalim, B.M. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 92 Civ. 3561
(KMW), 1994 WL 119575, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1994).
101. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. RLJ Lodging Trust, No. 13-cv-00758, 2014
WL 3830545, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2014).
102. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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privilege or work-product doctrine has not been waived104 and
other times require denial of production.105
The court in Baker v. CAN Ins. Co. added another factor to
be considered when attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine protections are invoked.106 There, the Court held that
production of a writing is only required “where the witness, after
having refreshed his recollection with the contested material,
discloses a significant portion of the substance of that
material.”107 This holding, properly interpreted, requires a
comparison of the documents reviewed with the witness’s
testimony. Disclosure will be required if a significant part of the
testimony overlaps with the content of the documents reviewed.
It has been criticized as follows:
This interpretation is unfair to the party
refreshing the witness’s recollection, however,
because portions of any document may
fortuitously overlap with the substance of the
witness’s testimony but not have been used by the
witness to refresh his recollection. As a
consequence,
the
second
interpretation
potentially requires the production of a broad
range of confidential materials that have no
relevance to the quality of the witness’s
recollection. Thus, this standard is flawed on both
counts – it either fails to address the adversarial
need presented by the use of the materials or is
unfair to the party calling the witness because the
disclosure it compels is disproportionate to the
need created.108
104. See, e.g., Server Tech., Inc. v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., No. 3:06CV-006980-LRH, 2011 WL 1447620, at *10 (D. Nev. Apr. 14, 2011) (attorneyclient privilege); Lawson v. United States, No. 97CIV.9239(AJP)(JSM), 1998
WL 312239, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1998) (work-product).
105. See, e.g., Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458,
468-70 (D. Md. 1998); Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 13, 16-17 (D.
Mass. 1988); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 119 F.R.D. 4, 5 (E.D.N.Y
& S.D.N.Y. 1988).
106. Baker v. CNA Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 322 (D. Mont. 1988).
107. Id. at 327.
108. RICE ET AL., supra note 52, at 270.
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Two discernable trends in applying this functional analysis
are present. One trend is to deny production when the writing
would disclose an attorney’s “mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories,” core opinion work product which is
specifically protected from disclosure by F.R.C.P. 26(b)(3)(B).109
The other trend is to order production of a writing, otherwise
protectable, excepting core opinion work product, when there is
evidence of improper witness “coaching.”110
A recent decision from the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., must be noted as it
expressed concern about the application of the functional
analysis standard in the context of a business’s internal
investigation led by company attorneys.111 In a qui tam action
under the Federal False Claims Act against Kellogg Brown &
Root, Inc. (“KBR”), a federal defense contractor, Plaintiff-Realtor
Barker alleged that KBR defrauded the U.S. Government by
inflating costs and accepting kickbacks.112 At issue was whether
KBR must disclose documents related to its internal
investigation concerning the underlying allegations that KBR
conducted pursuant to its Code of Business Conduct, which was
overseen by the company’s Law Department.113 The argument
for disclosure was that prior to a deposition noticed to cover the
KBR’s investigation, KBR’s designated employee for the
deposition reviewed the internal investigation documents
available, a review that triggered their production under Rule

109. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B); See, e.g., Barcomb v. Sabo, No. 07-CV877 (GLS/DRH), 2009 WL 5214878, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009); Napolitano
v. Omaha Airport Auth., No. 8:08CV299, 2009 WL 1393392, at *3-4 (D. Neb.
May 11, 2009); Lebow v. Meredith Corp., No. 05-2545-JWL, 2007 WL 1343744,
at *1-2 (D. Kan. May 4, 2007); Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 472-75; In re Comair
Air Disaster Litig., 100 F.R.D. 350, 353-54 (E.D. Ky. 1983).
110. See, e.g., Donjon Marine Co., v. Buchanan Marine, L.P., CIV. No.
3:09CV1005 (WWE), 2010 WL 2977044, at *2 (D. Conn. July 21, 2010); Parry
v. Highlight Indus., Inc., 125 F.R.D. 449, 452 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Derderian,
121 F.R.D. at 16-17; Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983)
(ordering production because “immunized materials should not remain
undiscoverable after they have been used to influence and shape testimony.”
(citation omitted)).
111. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
112. Id. at 140.
113. Id.
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612.114 The District Court ordered production.115 Concluding the
documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege and
the work-product doctrine, the Circuit Court concluded that
their production could not be ordered pursuant to Rule 612, and
reversed the District Court.116 The basis for its ruling was that
the balancing standard could not be used in the circumstances
to obtain the documents.117 It noted that production could not
be ordered where, as here, the party seeking production caused
the protected documents to be reviewed by placing them in issue
at the deposition.118 In this connection, the Court commented:
“[a]llowing privilege and protection to be so easily defeated
would defy ‘reason and experience,’ and ‘potentially upend
certain settled understandings and practices’ about the
protections for such investigations.”119
G. Scope of Production
Once a court determines that production is appropriate, the
entire writing is not produced. Rather, as directed by Rule
612(b), the court upon request must limit disclosure to that
portion of the writing used for refreshing recollection purposes
which “relates to” the witness’s testimony as refreshed.120 Thus,
unexamined parts or parts that were looked at but not relied
upon should be redacted from the portion prior to its
production.121 Such redaction should be done by the court at an
114. Id. at 143.
115. United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., 75 F. Supp. 3d 532
(D.D.C. 2014), vacated, In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d at 152.
116. Id. at 149.
117. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d at 144-45.
118. Id. at 144 (“To prepare adequately for the deposition, [the employee]
had no choice but to review documents related to the . . . investigation.”).
119. Id. at 145 (citations omitted).
120. S & A Painting Co. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407, 410 (W.D. Pa.
1984) (“‘testimony’ should be interpreted to mean only testimony which was
refreshed by the writing . . . [to] prevent[] the unfairness which would result
from broad disclosure merely because other parts of the writing, not used to
refresh recollection, may coincide with other parts of the deponent’s or
witness’s testimony.”); see also United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1540
(8th Cir. 1995).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Howton, 688 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1982);
Hollister Inc. v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 84 C 1987, 1988 WL 129988, at
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in camera review.122
III. New York’s Refreshing Recollection Doctrine as Developed
and Applied to Testifying Witnesses
A. Introduction
Unlike the doctrine in the federal courts, the refreshing
recollection doctrine in New York has been developed entirely by
the courts through its power to develop and formulate a common
law of evidence.123 This development has largely been achieved
by Court of Appeals rulings, with numerous decisions from the
Appellate Division Departments applying those rulings to fill in
the proverbial gaps created by them. Notably, this development
by the Court of Appeals has been achieved exclusively in the
context of witnesses testifying at the trial level. It has not
addressed issues such as whether the doctrine applies to
witnesses testifying at a deposition or whether the doctrine
applies to a witness before testifying at a trial or deposition.
The basics of this doctrine, i.e., when a writing or object can
be used to refresh the recollection of a witness while testifying,
the mechanics of how it is done, and the right of the opposing
party to inspect and use the material used will be addressed in
Part B. Part B will also explore the application of these two
aspects of the doctrine to a witness testifying at a deposition.
Part C will address when, if ever, a claim of privilege can defeat
the production right granted by the doctrine, an issue on which
the case law is sparse.

*1 (N.D. Ill. Dec 1, 1988).
122. See Smith & Wesson, Div. of Bangor Punta Corp. v. United States,
782 F.2d 1074, 1083 (1st Cir. 1986).
123. People v. Conyers, 420 N.E.2d 933, 936 (N.Y. 1981) (“our judicial
responsibility . . . to protect the integrity of the truth-finding process”); Fleury
v. Edwards, 200 N.E.2d 550, 554 (N.Y. 1964) (Fuld, J., concurring) (“The
common law of evidence is constantly being refashioned by the courts of this
and other jurisdictions to meet the demands of modern litigation. . . . Absent
some strong public policy or a clear act of pre-emption by the Legislature, rules
of evidence should be fashioned to further, not frustrate, the truth-finding
function of the courts in civil cases.”).
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B. Refreshing Recollection Doctrine
1. Basics
In New York, it has long been established that, in both civil
and criminal trial practice, an examining attorney may seek to
refresh the recollection of a witness during examination when
the witness exhibits difficulty recalling facts once known.124 In
the first reported decision invoking this rule, Lawrence v.
Barker,125 the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York in 1830
concisely stated: “The rule is that a written memorandum may
be referred to by a witness to refresh his memory. . . .”126 When
the witness’s memory is refreshed, the witness thereon testifies
from his or her independent recollection. The writing is not
admitted, as the witness’s testimony as refreshed is the evidence
and not the writing.127
The emergence of the refreshing recollection rule in New
York was the result of judicial recognition of its necessity as
otherwise a “party’s rights [would be] dependent upon unusual
strength of memory.”128 The rule was also supported by English
common law cases, cited by the New York courts, which
recognized the rule is based upon an accepted theory that certain
matters, acting as stimuli, brought to the witness’s attention can
start a chain of associations which prompts the witness to recall
that forgotten matter.129
124. See discussions in 5 ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER,
EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 6:80 (2d ed. 2011);
RICHARD T. FARRELL , PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 6-213 (11th ed.
1995); EDITH L. FISCH, FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 332 (2d ed. 1977); 2
ROLAND FORD, NEW YORK LAW OF EVIDENCE § 211 (1935); MICHAEL M. MARTIN
ET AL, NEW YORK EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 6.13 (2d ed. 2003).
125. Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 301 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1830).
126. Id. at 305.
127. See Howard v. McDonough, 77 N.Y. 592, 593-94 (1879); Marcly v.
Shults, 29 N.Y. 346, 351 (1864); People v. Reger, 213 N.Y.S.2d 298, 307 (App.
Div. 1961). See also BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 51.
128. Wise v. Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn, 4 N.E. 634, 634 (N.Y.
1886); see also Howard,
77 N.Y. at 594.
129. See, e.g., 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 758, at 127 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1970) (citing Lawes v. Reed, 2
Lewin 152, 153 (1835)). See also Dillard S. Gardner, Perception and Memory
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While the Rule in New York had its roots in written
memorandum prepared by the witness, that limitation was
rejected by the Court of Appeals in 1852 in Huff v. Bennett.130
The Court stated:
Although the rule is that a witness in general can
testify only to such facts as are within his own
knowledge and recollection, yet it is well settled
that he is permitted to assist his memory by the
use of any written instrument, memorandum or
entry in a book, and it is not necessary that such
writing should have been made by the witness
himself, or that it should be an original writing,
provided after inspecting it he can speak to the
facts from his own recollection.131
Consistent with Huff, subsequent judicial decisions have
approved the use of virtually any sort of writing.132 Decisions
also recognized that the rule was not limited to the use of writing
as the refreshing mechanism, permitting, for example, the use
of sound recordings.133 Although no New York case can be found
on point, it is likely as well that the courts would even approve
“a song, a scent, a photograph, and allusion. . . .”134 What
matters, in sum, is whether the writing or item used to refresh
recollection actually serves that purpose and not the document

of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 392 (1933); Robert M. Hutchins &
Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence—Memory, 41
HARV. L. REV. 860, 861-62 (1928).
130. Huff v. Bennett, 6 N.Y. 337 (1852).
131. Id. at 339.
132. See FISCH, supra note 124, at 216-17; MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124,
at 545 (collecting cases and noting “[t]here is no limit on the sort of writing
that may be used to stimulate memory . . . “).
133. See Seaberg v. N. Shore Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 925 N.Y.S.2d 669,
672 (App. Div. 2011); People v. Reger, 213 N.Y.S.2d 298, 307 (App. Div. 1961).
134. FISCH, supra note 124, at 217 (citing United States v. Rappy, 157
F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806 (1947)); see also Fanelli
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 141 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1944) (“The creaking of a hinge,
the whistling of a tune, the smell of seaweed, the sight of an old photograph,
the taste of nutmeg, the touch of a piece of canvas, may bring vividly to the
foreground a consciousness the recollection of events that happened years ago
and which would otherwise have been forgotten.”).
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or item used to refresh the recollection.135
The only prerequisite for the invoking of the rule is a
showing that the witness’s memory is “exhausted.”136 This
requirement of exhaustion is liberally construed as the courts
deem it permissible to seek to refresh the witness’s recollection
merely upon the witness’s response of “I do not recall” or “I
cannot remember” to a question.137
This view is confirmed by the Court of Appeals decision in
People v. Oddone where it permitted refreshment upon the fact
the witness’s testimony was equivocal.138
In this case,
Defendant was charged with murder, based upon an allegedly
excessive headlock on the victim, whom he was trying to subdue.
When a defense witness was questioned regarding the time
frame, the witness replied “I wasn’t keeping track of time. But it
could have been a minute or so. I don’t know.”139 Defense counsel
sought to refresh her recollection by showing the witness her
prior statement in which she said the time frame was “maybe 6
to 10 seconds.”140 The trial court refused to permit the defense
counsel to do so, stating that the witness had “given no
indication she needs her memory refreshed.”141 The Court held
the trial court erred and refreshing recollection should have
been permitted because the witness’s responses indicated, albeit
indirectly, that she had perceived the event and had some
memory of it.142 Properly read, Oddone shows the “exhaustion”
requirement should be liberally construed, and not strictly
applied, lest relevant evidence is kept from the jury.143

135. See Baker v. State, 371 A.2d 699, 705 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)
(referring to the common law rule in the United States, “[a]ll that is required
is that [the object] may trigger the Proustian moment.”).
136. Reger, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 307; Sofranski Bros., Inc., v. H. C. F. Koch &
Co., 147 N.Y.S. 1142, 1143 (App. Term 1914) (per curiam).
137. See Cohen v. Sun Ins. Off., 91 N.E. 265, 265-66 (N.Y. 1910); Nappi
v. Gerdts, 477 N.Y.S.2d 202, 203 (App. Div. 1984).
138. People v. Oddone, 3 N.E.3d 1160, 1164 (N.Y. 2013).
139. Id.
140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
141. Id.
142. Id. (“[T]he inference that her recollection could benefit from being
refreshed is a compelling one.”).
143. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 124, at 640.
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However, where the witness professes no lack of memory,
the rule cannot be invoked.144 For example, in People v. Boice, a
prosecution for criminally negligent homicide arising out of the
death of a pedestrian struck by a motorcycle driven by
Defendant, the trial court permitted the prosecution to refresh
the recollection of an eyewitness to the accident called on the
People’s direct case.145 The witness “had unequivocally testified
at trial that she believed the motorcycle to be travelling between
30 and 45 miles per hour,” and the Prosecutor sought to refresh
her recollection of the speed by showing her a copy of her prior
grand jury testimony at which she testified to a higher speed.146
The Appellate Court held the trial court erred because the
witness’s testimony showed that, “there was no need to have her
memory refreshed.”147 Likewise in Berkowsky v. New York City
Ry. Co., a wrongful death action arising out of Plaintiff’s
decedent’s fall from a platform of one of Defendant’s cars, the
trial court was found to have committed error when it permitted
the Plaintiff to refresh the recollection of a police officer who was
an eyewitness to the accident.148 The police officer, called by the
Plaintiff, testified that he saw decedent fall from the platform
before it stopped, testimony which was contrary to what he had
written in a memorandum after the accident.149 Despite his
repeated and persistent statements that his memory was clear
and needed no refreshing, Plaintiff was permitted to try to
refresh the witness’s recollection by reading to him his
memorandum in the presence of the jury.150 Among other errors
committed by the trial court in allowing such refreshment, the
Appellate Court held error was present because the witness
insisted that his memory needed no refreshing.151

144. See, e.g., People v. Ballard, 607 N.Y.S.2d 816, 816 (App. Div. 1985);
People v. Fross, 496 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (App. Div. 1985); People v. Boice, 455
N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (App. Div. 1982); Munro Athletic Prods. Co. v. Universal
Carloading & Distrib. Co., 53 N.Y.S.2d 170, 170 (App. Term 1944).
145. Boice, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
146. Id. at 860.
147. Id.
148. Berkowsky v. N.Y.C. Ry. Co., 111 N.Y.S. 989 (App. Div. 1908).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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The trial court retains discretion to control the refreshing
recollection process.152 This discretion is to be exercised in
determining whether the witness’s recollection has in fact been
refreshed, and the witness is not just relating what he or she just
read.153 The concern was expressed by one court as follows:
“There is danger in allowing a witness to refresh his memory by
a statement because he may not remember the facts in issue but
may very well testify to what he reads in the statement.”154
Additionally, the trial court must ensure that the contents of a
document being used by the examining attorney to refresh a
witness’s recollection are not disclosed to the jury as “it is not
proper under the guise of refreshing the recollection of [a
witness] to place before a jury matter or documents otherwise
inadmissible.”155
While the refreshing recollection rule has its roots in the
examination of a witness at trial, it should also be applicable at
a deposition when the witness-deponent is having difficulty in
recalling a relevant fact.156 The reason is that since the risk of a
witness’s memory loss is precisely the same whether the witness
is testifying at a trial or at a deposition, there is no principled
reason to not apply the rule in both situations. This is especially
true when one considers the distinct possibility the witness’s
deposition will become admissible at trial as trial evidence as
permitted by C.P.L.R. 3117.157 In fact, it can be compellingly
argued that the Legislature has so provided as C.P.L.R. 3113(c)
which governs depositions, provides in pertinent part that
“[e]xamination and cross-examination of deponents shall

152. See People v. Sexton, 80 N.E. 396, 401 (N.Y. 1907); People v. Di
Loretto, 541 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261-62 (App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 543 N.E.2d
756 (N.Y. 1989).
153. BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 124, at 642 (“Courts also perform
a supervisory role to assure that the witness really has an independent
recollection and that the material is being used merely to refresh that
recollection.”).
154. Brown v. W. Union Tel. Co., 274 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56 (App. Div. 1966).
155. People v. Reger, 213 N.Y.S.2d 298, 307 (App. Div. 1961).
156. The Court of Appeals has not addressed this issue. At least one
decision has recognized, albeit indirectly, that the refreshing recollection
process is applicable at a deposition. See McDonough v. Pinsley, 657 N.Y.S.2d
33, 34 (App. Div. 1997).
157. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3117 (McKinney 2016).
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proceed as permitted in the trial of actions in open court . . . .”158
In Thompson v. Mather, the Court, citing to C.P.L.R. 3113(c),
held that the well-settled rule that an attorney for a non-party
witness had no right to object during or participate in the trial
at which the witness was called to testify was equally applicable
to the attorney for a non-party witness at a deposition.159
Although the specific holding of Thompson has been legislatively
overruled by an amendment to C.P.L.R. 3113(c),160 it
nonetheless supports the application of the trial refreshing
recollection rule to a deposition.161
Overall, it is appropriate to view New York’s refreshing
recollection rule as applicable to all testifying witnesses,
whether testifying at trial or deposition. Succinctly stated, this
rule provides that if a witness at a trial or deposition has
personal knowledge of a relevant fact but while testifying at the
trial or deposition has difficulty in recalling it, the witness may
use any writing or object, without restriction as to authorship,
guaranty of accuracy or time of making, to stimulate his or her
recollection, and may thereafter testify to the fact from his or her
own memory. As so stated, New York’s rule is consistent with
the refreshing recollection rule recognized in the federal
courts162 and all other state courts.163
C. Right of Inspection of the Writing or Object Used for
Refreshing Recollection
New York law has also long recognized as an important
component of the refreshing recollection doctrine that the
opposing party has the right to inspect the writing or object used
for refreshing recollection purposes at the trial or deposition,
158. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3113(c) (McKinney 2014).
159. Thompson v. Mather, 894 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (App. Div. 2010).
160. Act of Sept. 23, 2014, ch. 379, § 1, 2014 N.Y. Laws 379 (amending
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3113(c) (McKinney 2014)).
161. Of note, this argument based on C.P.L.R. 3113(c) is fully consistent
with the federal court decisions applying FED. R. EVID. 612 to deposition
testimony by reason of FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1). See supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
163. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 6, § 32.7 (reviewing state evidence
codes).
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and then to use the writing or object on cross-examination for
impeachment purposes.164 This inspection and use right is
derived from early English common law cases as a means to
preclude perjured testimony.165 As stated by a New York court
in 1870:
The right of a party to protection against the
introduction against him of false, forged or
manufactured evidence, which he is not permitted
to inspect, must not be invaded a hair’s breadth.
It is too valuable to be trifled with, or to permit
the court to enter into any calculation as to how
far it may be encroached upon without injury to
the party.166
The cross-examination permitted gives the opposing party
the opportunity to determine through the use of the writing or
object whether the witness’s testimony is actually the product of
a revived recollection or merely a recitation of the facts
contained in the writing, the essence of “manufactured
evidence.”167 Only those parts of the writing or object that relate
to the witness’s testimony may be used for cross-examination
and admitted into evidence.168 A failure to permit such use will
constitute error.169
164. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 124, at 643; FISCH, supra note
124, at 217-18; MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 547; FARRELL, supra note 124,
at 365. A writing used may be admitted for substantive purposes if a hearsay
exception, such as the past recollection recorded exception, encompasses it. See
MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 546-47.
165. See WIGMORE, supra note 129, at 136, citing Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1
Car. & P. 582 (1824); Gregory v. Taversen, 6 Car. & P. 281 (1833); Palmer v.
McLean, 1 Sw. & Tr. 149 (1858).
166. Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1870). The
Court of Appeals endorsed this view of the inspection right Tibbetts recognized
in People v. Gezzo, 121 N.E.2d 380, 393-94 (N.Y. 1954).
167. See Peck v. Valentine, 94 N.Y. 569, 571 (N.Y. 1884); Schwickert v.
Levin, 78 N.Y.S. 394, 395-96 (App. Div. 1902). See also BROUN ET AL., supra
note 4, at 55 (“With the memorandum in hand, the cross-examiner has a good
opportunity to test the credibility of the witness’s claim that her memory has
been revived, and to search out any discrepancies between the writing and the
testimony.”).
168. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 647.
169. See Caupain v. Johnson, 247 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (App. Div. 1964)
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Notably, this inspection right provides the opposing party
with an absolute entitlement to inspect any writing or object
used during a trial or deposition.170 There are no qualifications
imposed on this right, and this right is not subject to the exercise
of judicial discretion.171 Furthermore, as this right is “too
valuable to be trifled with,”172 a denial of the right may not be
subject to a harmless error analysis.173
New York’s inspection and use right as to writings used by
witnesses while testifying is consistent with the mandatory and
unconditional production rule followed in the federal courts
pursuant to F.R.E. 612(b)174 and its state counterparts.175 The
only difference is that New York’s right is recognized under the
common law while in all other jurisdictions it is recognized by
legislative enactment.
D. Use of Privileged Matter
When the right of inspection is triggered, just as what occurs
under Rule 612, an issue will arise when the party in possession
of the writing claims that inspection and use of it at trial on
cross-examination pursuant to that right is barred because the
document contains materials which are protected from
disclosure under other provisions of New York law.176 The
sources of such protection are the statutory testimonial
privileges set forth in Article 45 of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules, most commonly the attorney-client privilege,177 and the
(“Trial Court erred in refusing to permit in evidence, when offered by
defendant, a report used by one of plaintiffs’ witnesses to refresh his
recollection. That report, made by a third party, was admissible on the question
of the credibility of the witness.”) (citations omitted).
170. People v. Gezzo, 121 N.E.2d 380, 383 (N.Y. 1954). See also People v.
Brown, 153 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div. 1956).
171. See People v. Woodrow, 238 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (App. Div. 1963);
Miller v. Greenwald Petticoat Co., 183 N.Y.S. 97, 99 (App. Div. 1920).
172. Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1870)
173. See Gezzo, 121 N.E.2d at 383; Schwickert v. Levin, 78 N.Y.S. 394,
395-96 (App. Div. 1902).
174. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
175. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 6, § 32:7 (reviewing state
evidence codes).
176. See supra notes 91-119 and accompanying text.
177. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503(a) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2017). The attorney
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New York’s work-product doctrine, consisting of the attorney
work-product privilege178 and the material prepared for
litigation privilege.179 The issue presented is whether the
refreshing recollection doctrine’s inspection right overrides any
such privilege claim based upon these sources.
Unlike in the federal courts where this same issue has been
resolved in favor of disclosure through interpretation of the
mandatory language of Rule 612 and its underlying legislative
history,180 resolution of this issue in New York will be made
strictly under the common law.
Rules of statutory
interpretation, in other words, have no rule in determining the
issue in New York, and the principles of the common law will
instead play a prominent role. Nonetheless, the federal
decisions can form a backdrop to the issue here in New York due
to the fact that New York’s right of inspection and privileges are
similar to the federal right of inspection and federal privileges.
Initially, it must be noted that this issue has not been
addressed by the Court of Appeals in any of its seminal decisions
adopting and applying the refreshing recollection doctrine’s
client privilege protects confidential communication between the client and the
client’s attorney, including the client’s and attorney’s agents, permitting when
invoked the client to refuse to disclose the communication and to prevent any
other privileged person from disclosing the communication. See generally
MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, §§ 5.2.1-5.2.7.
178. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(c) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2017). This section,
captioned “Attorney’s Work Product,” provides: “The work product of an
attorney shall not be obtainable.” Id. The New York courts follow the definition
of attorney work product set forth in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511
(1947), holding that it embraces such items as “interviews, statements,
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs,”
conducted, prepared of held by the attorney. See Kenford Co. v. Cty of Erie,
390 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (App. Div. 1977) (referring to attorney work-product as
a privilege).
179. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)(2) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2017). This
section, captioned “Materials” provides in pertinent part that “[M]aterials
otherwise discoverable . . . prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial . . .
may be obtained only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
by other means.” Id. It encompasses, as the statute states, any matter prepared
in anticipation of litigation, excepting only materials that are deemed attorney
work product. Id. It creates, in essence, a “conditional privilege.” Beach v.
Touradji Cap. Mgmt., LP, 949 N.Y.S.2d 666, 670 (App. Div. 2012). See DAVID
D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 348 (5th ed. 2011).
180. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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inspection right.181 A decision from the Appellate Division First
Department, McDonough v. Pinsley,182 has held that when a
witness uses a writing to refresh recollection while testifying at
a deposition, any privilege protecting that writing from
disclosure is waived by such use, observing that the opposing
party “is entitled to inspect the entire document.”183 However,
there is no analysis of the issue of waiver versus disclosure and
the only decision the Court cited in support of its holding
involved the use of a claimed privileged writing used to refresh
the recollection of a witness before the witness’s deposition.184
Decisions from the trial courts are similarly sparse, lack any
precedential value, and reach conflicting conclusions.185 Only
one referred to the underlying conflicting policies, concluding
that “[i]t is this court’s opinion that an adversary’s right to
examine writings used to refresh memory must be limited by the
greater sanctity accorded confidential communications between
attorney and client.”186
It is appropriate to start analysis by first looking at the
nature of the protection given against disclosure by these
privileges under New York law. As to the attorney-client
privilege, the Court of Appeals has held that it is not necessarily
absolute in the sense that it must always preclude disclosure of
the underlying privilege communication once its stated
requirements are met.187 Rather, the Court has observed, the
181. See supra notes 159-73 and accompanying text. The writings used
for refreshing recollection purposes in these cases were non-privileged.
182. McDonough v. Pinsley, 657 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1997).
183. Id. at 34.
184. Id. (citing Grieco v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div.
1987)).
185. See Falk v. Kalt, 253 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (disclosure was
barred as the papers were protected by the attorney-client privilege); E.R.
Carpenter Co. v. ABC Carpet Co., 415 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (Civ. Ct. 1979)
(privilege claim cannot bar disclosure).
186. Falk, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 189 (citing In re Van Gorder’s Will, 176
N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sur. Ct. 1957).
187. See Priest v. Hennessy, 409 N.E.2d 983, 985-86 (N.Y. 1980) (“The
privilege, however, is not limitless. It has long been recognized that ‘the
attorney-client privilege constitutes an “obstacle” to the truth-finding process,
the invocation of which should be cautiously observed to ensure that its
application is consistent with its purpose.’”) (quoting In re Jacqueline F. v.
Segal, 391 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 1979)); see also MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124,
§ 5.2.8 (“Notwithstanding the desirable purposes of the privileges, the courts
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privilege must “yield in a proper case, where strong public policy
requires disclosure.”188 The Court has also recognized various
situations where the privilege must yield either because the
privilege holder has engaged in conduct involving the
confidential communication which is inconsistent with the
privilege’s confidentiality requirement, such as a disclosure of
the communication to a third party,189 or other policy concerns
unrelated to protecting against disclosure, such as furthering
criminal activity,190 which situations provide a compelling basis
to preclude application of the privilege.
With respect to the work-product privileges, the courts have
uniformly held that as to a writing protected as attorney workproduct, the privilege granted is “absolute and unqualified.”191
The basis for this absolute protection is the strong public policy
for providing protection in litigation against disclosure to an
adverse party in litigation.192 On the other hand, the materials
prepared for litigation privilege is a “qualified” privilege.193 The
reason for this treatment is that C.P.L.R. 3101(d) requires
disclosure when a “court finds that [the covered material] can no
longer be duplicated and that denying disclosure will result in
‘injustice or undue hardship.’”194
Turning now to the right of inspection and use of the writing
or object used to refresh the witness’s recollection, it is largely
premised upon the judicially expressed view that inspection and
the potential for inspection of the refreshing tool will help
apply it cautiously because it impedes the truth-finding process.”).
188. Priest, 409 N.E.2d at 986 (citing Jacqueline F. v. Segal, 391 N.E.2d
967, 986 (N.Y. 1979)).
189. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 294-99 (waiver situations).
190. Id. at 328-33 (exceptions).
191. See, e.g., Gama Aviation Inc. v. Sandton Cap. Partners, L.P., 951
N.Y.S.2d 519, 521 (App. Div. 2012) (“attorney work product . . . is subject to an
absolute privilege.”); Beach v. Touradji Cap. Mgmt. LP, 949 N.Y.S.2d. 666, 670
(App. Div. 2012); Beasock v. Dioguardi Enter., Inc., 499 N.Y.S.2d 560, 560
(App. Div. 1986) (“absolute privilege”); Kenford v. Cty of Erie, 390 N.Y.S.2d
715, 718 (App. Div. 1977) (“unqualified privilege”).
192. Beasock, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 510-11 (1947)).
193. See Beach, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 670; Kenford, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 718; see
also 4 THOMSON REUTERS, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS
§ 45:29 (Robert L. Haig ed., 4th ed. 2015).
194. Kenford, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)
(McKinney 2014)).
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protect against the introduction of “false, forged or
manufactured evidence . . . .”195 Such purpose is so important
that it would be entirely inappropriate “to permit the court to
enter into any calculation as to how far it may be encroached
upon without injury to the party.”196
Balancing the interests sought to be protected by the
competing privilege right and inspection and use right in order
to determine whether these competing interests can be
accommodated or whether one right prevails over the other is a
proper way to resolve the issue presented. After all, such
balancing is the “inevitable element of the common-law process”
generally engaged in by the court to determine the rule or
portion to adopt.197
With such balancing employed, attorney-client privilege
protection should not be available for a writing otherwise
protectable by the privilege, as the invocation of the privilege
would restrict the ability to determine if the refreshing
recollection process was being used to create fraudulent or
perjured testimony – the purpose of the inspection right. The
truth-seeking purpose of the inspection right should therefore
prevail.198 As to the materials prepared for litigation privilege,
it too should yield to the inspection right. In that regard, the
protection interest of the privilege should not preclude the
inspection right because in the circumstances – witness is
testifying – the privilege’s qualifying condition, the need for the
material in the interest of justice, is present.199
Whether the work product privilege should give way
presents a more difficult situation due to that privilege’s
“absolute nature.” As the conflict essentially amounts to

195. People v. Gezzo, 121 N.E.2d 380, 394 (N.Y. 1954).
196. Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1870).
197. Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 649 (N.Y. 2004).
198. It should be noted that this loss of protection will occur when the
client or another privileged person is the person whose recollection is being
refreshed. When the witness is a third-party, the disclosure to that witness
will defeat the privilege doctrine as a waiver of the privilege has occurred based
on disclosure to a non-privileged person. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 2000).
199. See Yasnogordsky v. City of New York, 722 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (App.
Div. 2001) (need for witness statement); Rochford v. Long Island R.R. Co., 710
N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (App. Div. 2000) (need for witness statement).
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protecting the attorney’s opinions, etc. versus ascertaining the
truth, public policy would strongly suggest the truth interest
should prevail.200 To be sure, the Court in Beach v. Touradji
Capital Management, LP concluded otherwise with respect to an
attorney work product privilege claim asserted with respect to
privileged document used to refresh a witness’s recollection prior
to testifying at a deposition.201 The Court held that the absolute
nature of the privileged precluded a waiver.202 However,
different interests are involved when the refreshing recollection
doctrine is used before a witness testifies at deposition, which
can justify the holding.203 Alternatively, the result in Beach
reflects a questionable policy choice. In short, Beach does not
support a loss of attorney work product privilege protection
when a testifying witness is involved.
Nonetheless, support for a conclusion that the work product
protection, despite being viewed as absolute, is lost can be found
in federal court decisions decided before Rule 612 became
effective and state court decisions based on state common law
interpreting their states’ refreshing recollection doctrine. These
decisions held that the inspection right under the common law
trumped any right against disclosure.204 These decisions are all
based upon a finding that the use of the privileged document
effected a waiver of the privilege applicable to the document.
This waiver basis was expressed by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. O’Brien as follows:
Although the [refreshing recollection] rule does
not address itself directly to the issue of writings
protected by the work product doctrine, Federal
courts have held that the use of protected writings
200. See Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Mass. 1995);
City of Denison v. Grisham, 716 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. App. 1986).
201. Beach v. Touradji Cap. Mgmt., LP, 949 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div.
2012).
202. Id. at 670.
203. See RICE ET AL., supra note 52, at 146.
204. See, e.g., Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1927);
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1972); O’Brien, 645
N.E.2d at 1175; Summerlin v. State, 271 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Ind. 1971); see also
BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 59, 577 (at the common law any applicable
privilege lost when privileged document used to refresh recollection).

43

HUTTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

480

5/10/18 2:00 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38.2

to refresh memory on the stand constitutes a
waiver of that protection and the material used to
refresh memory must be shown to the opposing
party if requested.205
Three justifications have generally been advanced for this
waiver approach.206 First, it has been argued that waiver is
proper as the examining attorney on behalf of his or her client
has intentionally relinquished the applicable privilege as
established by the knowing choice of a privileged writing, rather
than a non-privileged writing, to show the witness.207 As noted
by a commentator, “[w]here the choice lies with the privilege
holder as to waive or not to waive, waiver upon disclosure to a
witness should be a no-brainer and should follow as the night
follows the day.”208 A second argument is that as the testimony
prompted by the document will necessarily disclose the contents
of a document used for refreshing recollection purposes, the
disclosure has effected a waiver.209 The third argument is that
as a rule precluding disclosure in the circumstances involved
would impair fairness of the trial process, a waiver rule is
necessary to prevent that result.210 As forcefully stated in
O’Brien:
It is clear to us that a rule against disclosure in
these circumstances would impair the fairness of
the trial process. For example, examining counsel
might choose only protected materials to refresh a
witness’s recollection in order to avoid a
potentially damaging cross-examination by
opposing counsel. There is also, obviously, the
205. O’Brien, 645 N.E.2d at 1175 (footnote omitted).
206. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 70, at § 6185 (discussing the
strengths and weaknesses of these justifications).
207. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bailey, 55 F.R.D. at 213.
208. 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE
WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 750 (6th ed. 2017).
209. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 706 (5th ed. 1990).
210. Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1176 (Mass. 1995)
(footnote omitted).
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danger of witness prompting by examining
counsel. Without the right to inspect the protected
writing, opposing counsel would have no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to the
accuracy of the writing and its effect on his or her
memory. Results such as these would go a long
way toward impairing the judicial process and are
therefore clearly unacceptable.211
The O’Brien unfairness rationale underlying its finding of a
waiver of privilege provides a separate and independent reason
for New York’s acceptance of a rule requiring the loss of
privileged status of a writing when used to refresh the
recollection of a witness while testifying. In that regard, it is
consistent with New York Law which recognizes the waiver of a
privilege when the privileged document is being used as a sword
and not as a shield, which would, if permitted, create an unfair
or unjust result.212 Such is the situation when the privileged
document is being used to refresh recollection, with the potential
of creating manufactured evidence.
In sum, New York’s refreshing recollection doctrine as
applied to testifying witnesses should include a waiver of
privilege component and it is likely that the Court of Appeals
when it addresses the issue will so rule.
Such a rule
complements the doctrine’s right of inspection and use of the
writing used to refresh the testifying witness’s recollection, and
truly makes the right absolute.

211. Id. (footnote omitted); see also BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 59
(“Finding a waiver when the writing is consulted by the witness while
testifying is obviously warranted; it would be patently unfair for a witness to
consult the writing while testifying in open court but refuse to allow the
opposing counsel to see the writing.”).
212. Am. Re-Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 837 N.Y.S.2d 616, 622 (App.
Div. 2007); see also McKinney v. Grand St., Prospect Park & Flatbush R.R. Co.,
10 N.E. 544, 544 (N.Y. 1887).
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IV. Applying New York’s Refreshing Recollection Doctrine to
Witnesses before Testifying
A. Introduction
An attorney in New York, as in all jurisdictions,213 can both
legally and ethically meet with a witness before the witness
testifies at a trial or a deposition in pending litigation to review
the witness’s knowledge about the subject matter of the
witness’s testimony and, in the course of that review, show the
witness a writing or other object to refresh the witness’s
recollection.214 Whether the opposing party then has any right
to have that writing or object disclosed, as under Rule 612, is an
issue that the Court of Appeals has not addressed.215 While
there are numerous Appellate Division decisions holding the
common law right of inspection and use of writings and objects
used to refresh a witness’s recollection while testifying at a trial
or deposition extends to the witness preparation situation, these
decisions, as will be shown, are conflicting and, for the most part,
lack any in-depth analysis of the issue presented. The governing
rules on this issue are uncertain.
Under the New York’s common law, there are essentially
three possible approaches: (1) deny a right of inspection and use;
(2) recognize an unqualified right of inspection and use; and (3)
authorize a court to grant a right of inspection and use in its
discretion.216 As to the third approach, it raises a further issue
as to whether the discretionary authority permits the court to
override any privilege claims or whether privileges must always
be respected in the exercise of that authority. Rule 612, as
previously discussed, can be used for guidance.217 This part will
address these approaches, note the federal approaches, and in
doing so advocate a position that the New York courts should
213. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
214. See In re Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 161, 171 (1880). However, there are
specific limitations set forth in Rule 4.2 of the New York’s Rules of Professional
Conduct. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2009) (limitations on
contacting represented individuals).
215. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
216. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 577.
217. See supra notes 86-119 and accompanying text.
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consider and adopt.
B. Applicability of the Doctrine
At common law, the early cases in the United States refused
to extend the recognized right of inspection with respect to
writings or objects to refresh a witness’s recollection to writings
or objects reviewed by a witness for refreshing recollection
purposes prior to testifying.218 The basis for this conclusion was
stated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as follows:
The right of an opposing party to examine any
paper used to refresh the recollection of any
witness on the stand at the trial is beyond
doubt. . . . But to extend this right to every paper
seen by a witness in the preparation of the case
before trial is a different matter. Such an
extension of the principle might turn every trial
into a fishing expedition and place a powerful
weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous
attorney.219
This result was criticized by the leading evidence scholars
at the time. Thus, Dean Wigmore wrote that the right of
inspection and use as applied to a testifying witness
should apply . . . to a memorandum consulted for
refreshment before trial and not brought by the
witness into court; for, though there is no
objection to a memory being thus stimulated, yet
the risk of imposition and the need of safeguard is
just as great. It is simple and feasible enough for
the court to require that the paper be sent for and
exhibited before the end of the trial.220
218. See, e.g., Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1927);
Leonard v. Taylor, 53 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Mass. 1944); State v. Magers, 58 P. 892,
896 (Or. 1899).
219. Leonard, 53 N.E.2d at 707 (citation omitted).
220. WIGMORE, supra note 129, at 140-41 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
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Professor McCormick wrote: “[t]he reasons [for the
testifying rule] seem equally applicable to writings used by the
witness to refresh his memory before he testifies.”221
With this criticism, another view emerged, recognizing that
the right of inspection should apply, not as an absolute right, but
rather as a discretionary right subject to a court’s sound
discretion.222 Those courts expressing this view showed a clear
repudiation of the earlier decisions, as shown in State v.
Mucci.223 The New Jersey Supreme Court used this case to
revisit its earlier precedent rejecting the extension of the right
to the pre-trial situation. In this criminal case, several of the
State’s witnesses refreshed their recollection prior to trial by
reading and discussing their earlier grand jury testimony. In
the course of their cross-examination, Defendant applied to
inspect the grand jury testimony admittedly used to refresh the
witness’s recollection, and the application was denied by the
trial court.224 The New Jersey Supreme Court held this ruling
to be reversible error. The Court emphasized that as a State’s
witness may properly refresh his recollection by examining his
grand jury testimony either before trial or while he is on the
witness stand, Defendant must then be given the right to inspect
the earlier testimony for purposes of cross-examination. The
Court unequivocally rejected any distinction between the
situation where the witness refreshes his recollection before trial
from that where he refreshes it at trial, pointing out that “the
one case is as compelling in reason and logic as the other,” citing
Dean Wigmore.225 In so concluding, the Court expressly
disapproved of its earlier decisions denying access.226
The view expressed in Mucci has been followed in the vast
majority of the state courts.227 As commented by Professor
221. CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK ET. AL., MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 17-18 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
222. See, e.g., Needelman v. United States, 261 F.2d 802, 806-07 (5th Cir.
1958); La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 60 F.R.D. 164, 168 (D. Del. 1973);
Alpha Finley v. Daly Tankship Corp., 44 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1942);
People v. Scott, 193 N.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Ill. 1963).
223. State v. Mucci, 136 A.2d 761 (N.J. 1957).
224. Id. at 766-67.
225. Id. at 767.
226. Id. at 767-68.
227. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 4, at 58 (noting that “[t]he most
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McCormick, “[d]oubtless the courts have thought that to require
inspection of such papers may unduly encourage prying into the
opponent’s file, but increasingly, the decisions reflect the view
that there is a public interest in the full disclosure of the source
of a witness’s testimony.”228
There is, however, a distinct minority of state courts that
adhere to the earlier judicial view that the inspection right does
not extend to pre-trial or pre-deposition situations.229 The basis
of their adherence to this no inspection rule is that the majority
and federal rule, which permits a court to override a privilege,
“weakens the attorney-client and work product privileges, both
by actual disclosure and by the chilling effect of potential
disclosure of documents.”230
In New York, prior to 1971, the status of the application of
the right of inspection and use to witnesses prior to testifying at
a trial or deposition was unclear.231 The Second Department in
People v. Campiglia held the trial court erred in not permitting
Defendant to examine statements made by the prosecution
witness and given to the police, which they had used to refresh
their recollection before trial.232 However, the Court cited no
authority for its conclusion and its holding appeared to be
limited to the precise facts before it – the review of the
statements occurred “immediately prior to testifying.”233 On the
other hand, the Court in Alfredsen v. Loomis ruled that
disclosure of a statement used by a witness to refresh his
recollection the day before testifying at a deposition was
required.234 It noted “[t]he time when the memorandum of
statement was referred to by the witness, whether at the trial or
examination or prior thereto, would seem unimportant. The
important factor in accelerating this trend has been the adoption of Federal
Rule of Evidence 612.”). See also Las Vegas Dev. Assocs., LLC v. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Court, 325 P.3d 1259, 1265 (Nev. 2014) (adopting the majority rule as it
found “federal caselaw on this issue to be persuasive”).
228. MCCORMICK ET. AL., supra note 221, at 18.
229. See State ex rel. Polytech, Inc. v. Voorhees, 895 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Mo.
1995) (collecting cases).
230. Id. at 15.
231. JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 467 (10th ed. 1973).
232. People v. Campiglia, 16 N.Y.S.2d 370, 370 (App. Div. 1939), aff’d, 39
N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1942).
233. Id.
234. Alfredsen v. Loomis, 148 N.Y.S.2d 468, 470 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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important fact is that it was used by him to refresh his
recollection and that it accomplished that purpose.”235 Other
decisions seemed to reject the extension of the right to the pretrial or pre-deposition situation, or at the very least were unclear
as to the rule that applied in that situation.236
Post-1971, the rule became clear, namely, there is a right of
inspection with respect to writings or objects used by a witness
prior to testifying, the result of a series of Appellate Division
decisions.237 In Doxtator v. Swarthout, the first of these
decisions, the Defendant physician in a medical malpractice
action testified at her deposition that, “she had reviewed some
notes made after the [underlying] incident. . . and that these
were used by her to refresh her recollection with respect to the
details of her testimony.”238 The trial court denied production of
the notes.239 The Fourth Department phrased the issue before
it as whether “the rule regarding inspection applied at an
examination before trial should be no more stringent than the
rule applicable to trial testimony.”240 The Court then held there
are “persuasive reasons to permit [the] inspection.”241 Those
reasons were expressed as follows:
Two of the leading texts on evidence in New York
favor application of the same rule to writings
consulted by a witness before trial as to those
during trial . . . for the reason that the ‘risk to the
adversary is precisely the same whether the
witness refreshes his recollection by consulting a
writing before trial or by consulting it while on the
witness stand during trial.’ We think it a sound
rule that writings used prior to testifying for the
purpose of refreshing the memory of a witness be
235. Id. (citation omitted).
236. See Bata v. Chase Safe Deposit Co., 99 N.Y.S.2d 535, 578-79 (Sup.
Ct. 1950), aff’d sub nom. Bata v. Bata, 108 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. Div. 1951), aff’d,
115 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y. 1953); In re Hewett’s Will, 70 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 1947),
aff’d, 74 N.E.2d 482 (N.Y. 1947).
237. FARRELL, supra note 124, § 6-215, at 365.
238. Doxtator v. Swarthout, 328 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (App. Div. 1972).
239. Id.
240. Id. (citations omitted).
241. Id.
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made available to the adversary whether at the
trial . . . or at pre-trial examination.242
All the other Appellate Division Departments have since
followed Doxtator.243
Extending the right of inspection and use of writings and
objects used to refresh the recollection of a witness before
testifying at a trial or a deposition reflects sound public policy.
While it may be true that such an extension can lead to fishing
expeditions, trial delays due to the need to obtain a document
protracted on cross-examination, and the abrogation of privilege
rights, those concerns can be addressed in follow-up issues,
specifically, whether the pre-trial or pre-deposition right is
absolute and automatically granted and whether privilege
policies should be respected or accommodated, as discussed
infra.244 In the end, the extension should be viewed by asking
the following rhetorical question posed by a commentator: “[I]s
there any reason why we should have one rule for a witness who
refers to a writing on the witness stand to refresh his memory
and a different rule for a witness who refers to a writing on the
courthouse steps for the same purpose?”245
There is none.

242. Id. at 151-52 (citations omitted).
243. See, e.g., Grieco v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (App. Div.
1987); Rouse v. Cty. of Greene, 495 N.Y.S.2d 496, 496-97 (App. Div. 1985);
Merrill Lynch Realty Commercial Servs. Inc. v. Rudin Mgmt. Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d
16, 17 (App. Div. 1983).
244. See infra notes 263-88 and accompanying text.
245. John C. Burke, Witness Rules Change, Codify Nebraska Law, 53
NEB. L. REV. 406, 414 (1974).
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C. Used to Refresh Recollection
New York law, as shown in the preceding section, authorizes
the inspection of a writing or object if a witness used the writing
or object while preparing to testify at a trial or deposition. What
constitutes use by the witness? In the absence of Court of
Appeals precedent, there are conflicting lines of authority.
The first line is represented by decisions from the First,
Third, and Fourth Departments.246 These decisions hold the
right of inspection is triggered only when the witness had
actually used the material to refresh recollection and the
material has become the basis of pretrial or trial testimony.247
This definition is consistent with the inspection right’s purpose,
i.e., to examine fully the witness’s credibility, lest manufactured
evidenced is admitted.248 It is also sound as it is responsive to
the fishing expedition objection that material that has to be
produced is limited to only the material actually used for
refreshing recollection purposes. Expressed differently, if the
materials were not used to refresh recollection and did not form
the basis of the actual testimony, the materials have no
relevance to the witness’s credibility.249 This foundation element
for invoking the inspection right is consistent with federal case
law interpreting Rule 612, which has helped to limit abuse of the
inspection right.250
A foundation for a court to conclude the requisite use is
present will have to be established. An example of a successful
effort in establishing the foundation is in Alfredsen v. Loomis.251
At a witness’s deposition, the following questions were asked
and answers given:

246. See, e.g., Fernekes v. Catskill Reg’l Med. Ctr., 906 N.Y.S.2d 167, 169
(App. Div. 2010); Stern v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 730, 730 (App.
Div. 1990); Rouse, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97; Merrill Lynch Realty Commercial
Servs. Inc., 462 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
247. See Stern, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
248. Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1870).
249. See Rouse, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
250. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
251. Alfredsen v. Loomis, 148 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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Q. Since that time, have you seen that statement
that you gave to Mr. Cherin?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When?
A. I have a copy of it.
Q. You have a copy of it? When did you last read
it?
A. Yesterday.
Q. What was the purpose of your reading it
yesterday?
A. To refresh me a little bit about the dates.
Q. And about the things there were in the
statement? Is that the purpose of it?
A. I remember some of – Well, yes. * * *
Q. When you read it yesterday, did it help to
refresh your recollection of a lot of things?
A. I remembered the things in the statement.252
The witness’s answers showed to the Court the “important
fact” that the statement was used by him to refresh his
recollection and that it accomplished that purpose.253
On the other hand, the following Q and A was found to be
insufficient to establish the requisite foundation in Timm v.
Mead Corp.:254
Question: What did you do to prepare for this
deposition today?
Answer: When I copied all of the documentation I
took another pass through it.
Question: Meaning you reviewed the documents
as you copied them?
Answer: I copied them, took them whole, had the
stack and kind of walked through to try to refresh
my memory.

252. Id. at 469.
253. Id. at 470.
254. Timm v. Mead Corp., No. 91 C 5648, 1992 WL 32280, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 7, 1992).
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Question: When you say you walked through it or
as you passed through them, does that mean you
read each and every one of them. Or that you just
took a glance at each page?
Answer: Basically, just took a glance.255
The Court took “[f]rom this testimony it is not possible to
conclude that the deponent reviewed and relied upon the
documents in giving his testimony, nor is it possible to conclude
that the documents had any impact on his testimony.”256 The
Court denied production of the notes as a result.257
Of course, a witness could frustrate such an inquiry in order
to preclude production of the materials by not being fully
truthful in responding to the questions. However, such conduct
could be overcome by the party seeking production by further
questioning the witness concerning the circumstances
surrounding the witness’s overall preparation, and the receipt
and viewing of the materials, i.e., only document reviewed,
length of time reviewing. The answers can form sufficient
circumstantial proof to establish the requisite use.258
The other line of authority is represented by a decision from
the Second Department, Crawford v. Lahiri.259 In this case, a
wrongful death medical malpractice action, Plaintiff sought
disclosure of any records reflecting treatment of the Plaintiff’s
decedent reviewed by the Defendant physician in preparation for
his deposition. The Court ordered disclosure stating:
[I]f [Defendant] reviewed any records regarding
the plaintiff’s decedent’s treatment in preparation
for his testimony, he was required to divulge that
fact and turn over the records, whether or not his
review was expressly admitted to be for purposes
255. Id. at *1-2.
256. Id. at *6.
257. Id.
258. See Chabica v. Schneider, 624 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (App. Div. 1995)
(witness “looked at” and “read” his diary immediately before trial; diary
contained his notes of conversations with Defendant after the incident). See
also RICE ET AL., supra note 52, § 9:30, at 150-52.
259. Crawford v. Lahiri, 673 N.Y.S.2d 189 (App. Div. 1998).
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of refreshing his recollection.260
Under this broad interpretation of “use,” the Court has set
up a low threshold for invoking the inspection right, namely, a
witness’s “looking at” a document prior to testifying.261
Crawford is an outlier in its adoption of such a low threshold
for triggering the inspection right in view of the other Appellate
Division decisions, and as well the federal case law interpreting
Rule 612, which the other New York decisions follow, all of which
require substantially more than just “looking at” the material.262
The Second Department cited no precedent on point in support
of its conclusion.263 To the extent its purported justification is
that this low threshold will prevent a witness from barring
inspection by an averment that he or she did not rely on the
material in refreshing recollection, such goal can be
accomplished by other means, as just noted above. This view,
which in effect condones fishing expeditions, has not withstood
analysis and should not be followed.
D. Mandatory or Discretionary Right
Concluding that the right of inspection does apply to
writings or objects actually used to refresh the recollection of
witnesses before testifying at a trial or deposition does not end
analysis of the right. The further issue that now needs to be
addressed is whether New York’s common law should make this
right mandatory or discretionary, the latter allowing the court
to grant or withhold the right. As the backdrop for this issue,
Rule 612 provides the right of inspection is discretionary in
situations involving the preparation of trial witnesses or
deposition witnesses.264
260. Id. at 191 (citations omitted).
261. Id.
262. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
263. The cases cited in support, McDonough, Chabica, and Stern, in fact,
stand for the proposition that the materials viewed were used for refreshing
recollection purposes and that they became the basis for the witness’s
testimony. See McDonough v. Pinsley, 657 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1997);
Chabica v. Schneider, 624 N.Y.S.2d 271 (App. Div. 1995); Stern v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 730 (App. Div. 1990).
264. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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The unanimous view of all of the Appellate Division
Departments is that the right of inspection when invoked at
either a trial or a deposition is a mandatory right.265 Thus, once
it is established that a witness used the writing or object for
refreshing his or her recollection and the material formed the
basis of his or her testimony at the trial or deposition, the Court
must direct production of that material to the opposing party,
subject to a possible privilege claim.266 The rationale for holding
this right to be mandatory in all situations was expressed by the
Appellate Division Fourth Department as follows:
When these notes were used by [the] defendant to
refresh her recollection, they became material
affirmatively used in litigation and thus removed
from the protection afforded under discovery
practice, because her adversary then had a
legitimate interest in inspecting this material in
order to conduct a meaningful examination.267
The above stated rationale is certainly persuasive enough to
support the mandatory nature of the right. This is especially
true as it furthers the goal of this right to guard against
manufactured evidence.268 Nonetheless, problems can arise once
production is directed as a matter of right, which might suggest
this mandatory rule should be continued.
When the mandatory right is invoked at trial, and the
witness does not bring the refreshing material to court, an
adjournment of the trial would be in order to allow the witness
to obtain it. If the material is readily available, i.e., at the
attorney’s nearby office or the witness’s nearby office or home,
only a brief recess would be in order. However, even such a brief
recess would be disruptive of the trial process, especially the
cross-examination which is interrupted. Moreover, if the
265. See, e.g., McDonough, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Stern, 552 N.Y.S.2d at
730; Grieco v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (App. Div. 1987); Rouse v.
Cty. of Greene, 495 N.Y.S.2d 496, 496-97 (App. Div. 1985).
266. See McDonough, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Stern, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 730;
Grieco, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 432; Rouse, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 496-97.
267. Doxtator v. Swarthout, 328 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (App. Div. 1974).
268. See Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201, 203 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1870).
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material were at a distant location, a brief recess would turn into
a lengthy one, making a delay in the trial even longer, causing
scheduling problems and inconveniencing jurors.
It is certainly possible to prevent this problem by a court
directive commanding all witnesses to bring to court with them
material they reviewed so that in the event it is determined that
the witness in fact used the material to refresh his or her
recollection, thereby triggering disclosure, the material is
available during cross-examination.269 However, gathering the
materials looked at, and bringing it to court could seriously
inconvenience the witness. An additional issue could also arise
if the witness fails to comply with such a direction, namely
sanctions, if any, to be meted out for the failure, e.g., contempt,
monetary sanction, or even the striking of the witness’s direct.
Similar problems arise with deposition witnesses. If it is
determined that the witness used material to refresh his or her
recollection before the testimony begins and the witness did not
bring the material to the deposition or the material not
otherwise readily available, the deposition will need to be
adjourned and rescheduled, causing delays in the pre-trial
discovery process. While motion practice seeking an order to
compel production prior to the deposition could be pursued,270
time and expense would have to be incurred to make the motion,
which would be compounded if an appeal were taken from the
order determining the motion.271
These problems cannot be labeled trivial.
While
enforcement of the “use” requirement should reduce the extent
of these problems, it is clear there will be instances where the
requirement is met, triggering the mandatory production
required under current case law. The problems will, in sum,
remain.

269. New York’s Third Judicial District established a local rule which
provides that “[e]xperts who testify at trial must bring with them to Court their
entire file and all documents considered in arriving at their opinion(s).” N.Y.
State Unified Court Sys., Trial Rules and Special Directives, NYCOURTS.GOV
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/3jd/JudgesRules/3JD-Judges%
20Rules.shtml#trialrules. No provision in the C.P.L.R. would bar a judge from
adopting a similar rule with respect to fact witnesses.
270. See Crawford v. Lahiri, 673 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (App. Div. 1998).
271. Id.
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A modification of the current common law established
mandatory right of inspection is in order. The preferable
approach, similar to the approach of Rule 612, is to modify
current law by eliminating the mandatory nature of the right
and in its place, require production of the material used only if
a court in the exercise of its discretion decides disclosure is
warranted “if justice so requires.”272 The New York courts have
considerable experience in applying such a standard as the basis
for a judicial ruling in view of the numerous instances in the
C.P.L.R. that direct a court to act in “the interest of justice.”273
Sufficient room is left for a court to order production when
circumstances warrant it, e.g., suspicion of the creation of
manufactured evidence.
E. Claim of Privilege
Before disclosure of the refreshing material used can be
ordered by a court in the exercises of its discretion, it is
necessary to determine whether the material used is protected
by a privilege and, if it is so protected, whether the privileged
status can preclude disclosure of material. As previously noted,
the pertinent privileges are the attorney-client privilege,
attorney work-product privilege, and materials prepared for
litigation privilege.274 As also previously noted, privilege
protection for materials used to refresh a witness’s recollection
while testifying is ordinarily lost, or should be lost, under a
waiver theory.275 Should this same result occur in the pre-trial
or pre-deposition situation?
The New York courts are split on the issue. The split
appears to turn upon conflicting views as to whether the strong
interest in disclosure of material used for refreshing recollection
purposes always overrides the interest of privileges in limiting
disclosure to further other interests, or whether disclosure must
272. FED. R. EVID. 612(c).
273. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2005 (McKinney 2005) (excusing delay or
default); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 306-b (McKinney 2013) (extension of time to serve
complaint); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3403(a)(3) (McKinney 2007) (trial preferences); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4404(a) (McKinney 2007) (motion for new trial).
274. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
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yield at times to the separate and different interests of the
particular privilege involved. Two lines of decision, with splits
within each line as well, have emerged.
The First, Second, and Fourth Departments have expressed
the view that “any” privilege which applies to the material used
is automatically waived by that use.276 This conclusion of waiver
is based upon the courts’ view that the right of inspection is
absolute.277
The other line of cases approaches and resolves the issue by
considering the underlying policy of the particular privilege
being asserted. Starting first with the attorney-client privilege,
two reported decisions have considered attorney-client privilege
claims. In Falk v. Kalt, Plaintiff used several confidential
communications between Plaintiff and his attorney to refresh
his recollection before his deposition.278 The Court considered
these communications to be protected by the attorney-client
privilege.279 The Court then held there was no waiver, based on
its “opinion that an adversary’s right to examine writings used
to refresh memory must be limited by the greater sanctity
accorded confidential communications between attorney and
client.”280 On the other hand, in E.R. Carpenter Co. v. ABC
Carpet Co., Inc., the Court ordered disclosure of a claimed
memorandum which Plaintiff argued was protected by the
It held that even if the
attorney-client privilege.281
memorandum were protected by the privilege, waiver was
present by reason of the use of the memorandum to refresh the
Plaintiff’s recollection prior to his deposition.282 Noting that the
276. See McDonough v. Pinsley, 657 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (App. Div. 1997);
Stern v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 730, 730 (App. Div. 1990); Grieco
v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (App. Div. 1987); Merrill Lynch Realty
Commercial Servs. v. Rudin Mgt. Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17 (App. Div. 1983);
Doxtator v. Swarthout, 328 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (App. Div. 1974). In none of
these cases was the privilege invoked specified.
277. McDonough, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 34; Stern, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 730; Grieco,
512 N.Y.S.2d at 432; Merrill Lynch Realty Commercial Servs., 462 N.Y.S.2d at
17; Doxtator, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
278. Falk v. Kalt, 253 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
279. Id. at 189.
280. Id.
281. E.R. Carpenter Co. v. ABC Carpet Co., 415 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Civ. Ct.
1979).
282. Id. at 353.
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issue before it was a “most difficult question as it seemingly
places the essential attorney-client privilege in direct conflict
with the just-as-essential right of cross-examination,”283 the
Court held “basic considerations of fair play” and the inspection
right’s goal of preventing the admission of “manufactured
evidence,” outweighed the goal of the attorney-client privilege.284
The First Department, departing from its view that any
privilege is waived, held in Beach v. Touradji Capital
Management, LP285 that use of materials protected by the
attorney work-product privilege used for refreshing recollection
purposes does not result in a waiver of the privilege.286 Citing in
support a decision from the Third Department287 and a decision
from the Fourth Department,288 which previously so held, the
First Department concluded that due to the absolute nature of
protection accorded that privilege, it could not be abrogated
merely by its refreshing recollection use.289 On the other hand,
the Second Department in Grieco v. Cunningham held to the
contrary.290 The Court rejected an effort to treat attorney workproduct protected writings differently, due to its unique policy,
from other privileges where waiver is automatic.291
There is unanimity, however, among the courts with respect
to documents protected by the materials prepared for litigation
privilege – this privilege is waived.292 The basis for this
conclusion is the privilege’s conditional nature, i.e., the privilege
is defeated if it is shown that withholding it would result in
injustice or undue hardship,293 and not absolute as with the

283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Beach v. Touradji Cap. Mgmt., LP, 949 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div.
2012).
286. Id. at 669.
287. Fernekes v. Catskill Reg’l Med. Ctr., 906 N.Y.S.2d 167, 170 (App.
Div. 2010).
288. Geffers v. Canisteo Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 463201, 482 N.Y.S.2d 635,
636 (App. Div. 1984).
289. Beach, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 669-70.
290. Grieco v. Cunningham, 512 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (App. Div. 1987).
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Beach, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 669-70; Rouse v. Cty. of Greene, 495
N.Y.S.2d 496, 496-97 (App Div. 1985).
293. Rouse, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
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attorney work-product doctrine.294 In essence, the basis for the
waiver is the privilege itself as depriving the cross-examiner
access to the writing is an unjust result.295 Notably, the First
Department has pointed out the different waiver result
depending upon whether the document is protected by the
attorney work-product privilege or the materials prepared for
litigation purposes.296
The First Department in Matter of Lenny McN added
another factor for consideration when waiver is in issue, the
nature of the proceeding involved.297 In this case the Court held
a social worker’s review of a confidential case file of a social
worker prior to testifying in a Family Court proceeding to
determine custody in the best interest of an infant did not
constitute a wholesale waiver of the privileges that attached to
the file.298 In the Court’s view, “the confidentiality and
sensitivity of Family Court custodial litigation clearly call for
stricter limitations [on the refreshing recollection privilege
waiver rule].”299 Whether privileges could ever be waived in a
Family Court proceeding has not been the subject of any further
discussion.
The conflicting decisions create much uncertainty as to
whether a privilege is waived when the privileged material is
used to refresh a witness’s recollection before testifying at a trial
or a deposition, with a potentially sweeping risk of waiver
looming large by such use. Clarification by the Court of Appeals,
if not by the Legislature, is needed.
What should be the nature of such clarification? There is
much to commend the view that the attorney-client privilege and
the attorney work-product privilege is not waived by a pre-trial
or pre-deposition use of the material protected, based on their
protective policies. Likewise, the conclusion that the materials
prepared for litigation privilege is waived by use of material

294. Id.
295. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 548.
296. Beach, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 670. The court remanded the case to the trial
court to determine which of the two privileges are applicable to the various
types of material used for refreshing recollection purposes. Id.
297. In re Lenny McN, 584 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1992).
298. Id. at 18.
299. Id.
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protected by that privilege for refreshing recollection purposes
pre-trial or pre-deposition is based on supportable policy
grounds. Adoption of these conclusion as part of New York’s
common law would eliminate the current uncertainty with
workable waiver rule.
To be sure, this position is at odds with the conclusion that
use of a writing or object to refresh the recollection of a witness
while testifying waives any privilege that attaches to such
material.300 However, different treatment is warranted. In this
regard, the waiver rule applicable to testifying witnesses is
largely based on unfairness concerns that would be present if
one party could freely use the material to refresh a witness’s
recollection on the witness stand while preventing other parties
from ever seeing the material.301 This situation has been
described as “bizarre.”302 However, when the privilege material
is used before a trial or deposition, the risk of unfairness is not
that great when a privilege bars production of materials used
before a trial or hearing.303
Nonetheless, a broad anti-waiver rule would create an
untenable situation where the material is reviewed for
refreshing recollection purposes shortly before testifying. Since
the review is intended to refresh the witness’s recollection on a
matter the witness will soon testify about, the refreshing
recollection process is in essence the equivalent of refreshing
recollection while testifying. To argue that waiver cannot
automatically occur because the process is not occurring “‘while
testifying’ . . . elevates form over substance,” and thus is a
questionable argument.304 Certainly, the waiver rule applicable
to witnesses “while testifying” should apply in this situation.
On balance, a workable and fair resolution of the privilege
waiver issue would be that the attorney-client privilege and the
attorney work-product privilege is not waived by the use of a
writing or object protected by either of those privileges for
refreshing a witness’s recollection before testifying at a trial or
hearing, but the material proposed for litigation privilege is
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
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Cf. RICE ET AL., supra note 52, § 9:40, at 260.
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waived. While a court would have no discretion to rule
otherwise, it would have discretion to determine whether a
refreshing recollection process should be deemed to have
occurred “while testifying” when the process occurs close to the
witness’s appearance at the trial or deposition.
V. Conclusion
What can an attorney learn from the above discussion of
New York law as to the consequences of a witness reviewing
privileged documents before testifying at a trial or deposition?
There is a right of inspection given to opposing attorneys of
writings used in a witness preparation session to refresh the
witness’s recollection about a relevant fact before testifying at a
trial or deposition where that writing had a clear impact on the
witness’s testimony.
The fact that the writing is protected against disclosure by
a privilege recognized in New York law may or may not preclude
the exercise of that inspection right. Present law is decidedly
unclear about the effect of a privilege claim raised in response to
a demand for inspection.
Present law will obviously have a substantial overall effect
on an attorney’s decision as to what should be provided to the
witness for review, and how the refreshing recollection process
is handled. Viewing that decision from the perspective of the
opposing attorney, it can be expected that the attorney on his or
her examination of the witness will ask: “Have you reviewed any
materials in preparation for your testimony here?”; and if the
answer is “Yes”, the immediate follow-up question will be:
“Please specifically identify the materials reviewed.” From that
point, the attorney will explore whether that review was
engaged in in order to refresh the witness’s recollection, thereby
triggering the inspection right.
How then should an attorney proceed in preparing a witness
in advance of the witness’s testimony at a trial or deposition?
Initially, it is imperative that the attorney proceed cautiously,
lest a privileged document containing sensitive information ends
up in the hands of the opposing party’s attorney. Indeed, the
attorney should presume that any document used in the
preparation session to refresh the recollection of a witness will
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end up in the hands of the opposing attorney. The attorney
should not just provide the witness with all the writings that
could refresh recollection at the start of the preparation and ask
the witness to review them. Rather, the attorney should start
by asking the witness whether the witness remembers an event
to determine whether the witness needs memory help. If the
witness does not, then the attorney should review the pertinent
writings that have potential for refreshing recollection and
determine which of those writings are protected by privilege.
Only the non-privileged writings should be provided to the
witness. Where the only writing available for refreshing
recollection purposes is privileged, the attorney will need to
decide whether the witness’s testimony is so important to the
attorney’s case that the possible loss of privilege is outweighed
by the need for the testimony.
In sum, under present New York law an attorney preparing
a witness cannot reasonably expect that the confidentiality of
writings used in the course of the preparation will remain
confidential, even if privileged. Full understanding of the
consequences of showing a privileged writing, as discussed in
this article, is necessary for the attorney to competently
represent the attorney’s client.
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